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The Free Exercise of Religious Identity
Lauren Sudeall Lucas
AbsTRAcT
In recent years, a particular strain of argument has arisen in response to decisions by 
courts or the government to extend certain rights to others.  Grounded in religious 
freedom, these arguments suggest that individuals have a right to operate businesses or 
conduct their professional roles in a manner that conforms to their religious identity.  For 
example, as courts and legislatures have extended the right to marry to same-sex couples, 
court clerks have refused to issue marriage certificates to such couples, claiming that 
to do so would violate their religious beliefs.  Similarly, corporations have refused, for 
reasons grounded in religious identity, to participate in health insurance plans that cover 
certain contraceptive devices.
While not always successful, these claims have typically been recognized by courts as 
claims of religious exercise under the Free Exercise Clause.  This Article draws on past 
work suggesting that the law should protect the individual’s right to define and pursue 
one’s own identity within a more limited, internal sphere, but that law, and not identity, 
should govern relationships among individuals and groups in society.  It argues that these 
claims might be viewed as analogous to other identity-based claims and, as a result, 
subjected to similar limitations.
The U.S. Constitution does and should protect the individual’s ability to define one’s own 
religious identity, engage in practices that reinforce that identity, and determine how 
one relates to the law (which may sometimes necessitate accommodation).  It should 
not, however, be understood to protect identity when projected outward, onto non-
identifying individuals or the government in its regulation of others.  Thus, protective 
claims of religious identity, which aim to protect identity as a personal matter—exercised 
with an eye toward the individual or religious community—should fall within the ambit 
of the Free Exercise Clause.  Projective claims of religious identity, however—those that 
attempt to impose one’s identity on others, dictate how the law relates to non-identifying 
individuals, or conform the law or government practices to one’s internal conception of 
identity—should not be cognizable as constitutional claims.  The protective-projective 
distinction is consistent with underlying themes in the Court’s free exercise jurisprudence 
and may help to cabin claims like those described above without minimizing the 
significance of religious identity.
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, a particular strain of argument has arisen in response to 
protections that the courts or the government have extended to others.  
Grounded in religious freedom, these arguments suggest that individuals have 
a right to operate businesses or conduct their professional roles in a manner 
that conforms to their religious faith.  For example, as courts and legislatures 
have extended the right to marry to same-sex couples, court clerks have refused 
to issue marriage certificates to such couples or to provide them with related 
services such as wedding photography, claiming that to do so would violate 
their religious beliefs.1  In another context, corporations and other entities have 
refused, for reasons grounded in religious identity, to facilitate employment-based 
group health insurance plans that cover certain contraceptive devices.2 
The parties in these cases have contended, among other things, that to 
act—or be compelled to act—in such a manner violates their right to free exer-
cise of religion under the First Amendment.3  The courts entertaining their 
claims have accepted the fact, without much discussion, that these are cog-
nizable religious exercise claims.4  Perhaps because courts are often hesitant to 
question the sincerity or validity of religious beliefs, they have focused their en-
ergies on the nature of the law at issue and its effect on religion, asking whether 
the law is neutral and generally applicable.5  Alternatively, courts might con-
centrate on the nature of the resulting discrimination and its effect on others.6 
In previous work, I have highlighted the dangers of conflating identity and 
law, arguing that while the formation and maintenance of identity is a highly per-
sonal and individualized endeavor, the law serves a very different purpose.7  The 
law’s primary role is to negotiate relationships among individuals and groups, 
  
1. See infra Part III.C. 
2. See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Little Sisters of 
the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 1022 (2014). 
3. See, e.g., infra Part III.C. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. See infra Part I.A. 
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as well as between individuals or groups and the state.8  While the U.S. Consti-
tution protects a sphere of personal freedom to define and pursue one’s identi-
ty,9 it should not be understood to protect identity when projected externally 
and imposed on others, particularly when others’ rights and possibly their 
identity may be affected as a result.10  Indeed, that would undermine the very 
notion that every individual is free to define his or her own identity and to con-
struct or adopt a set of values that accompany that identity.  It may also inter-
fere with proper operation of the law, which should turn not on individualized 
conceptions of identity, but on the values and other principles by which we as a 
society choose to structure legal relationships between individuals and the 
state.11 
  
8. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “law” as “a rule or system of rules recognized by a 
country or community as regulating the actions of its members and enforced by the 
imposition of penalties.”  Law, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2011). 
9. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015) (“The Constitution promises liberty 
to all within its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific rights that allow persons, within a 
lawful realm, to define and express their identity.”); id. at 2597 (holding that the liberties 
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “extend to certain 
personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that 
define personal identity and beliefs”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (“At the 
heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 
universe, and of the mystery of human life.” (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992))); see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 
1, 551 U.S. 701, 797 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Under our Constitution the 
individual, child or adult, can find his own identity, can define her own persona, without state 
intervention that classifies on the basis of his race or the color of her skin.”).  Relatedly, 
William Marshall has argued that the First Amendment should be understood as “a source of 
freedom to seek ideas, rather than as a vehicle to protect the ideas one already has.”  William 
P. Marshall, Religion as Ideas: Religion as Identity, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 385, 403 
(1996).  This view aligns with the idea that courts should protect the freedom to seek out and 
define one’s own religious identity, but they should not protect the exercise of religious 
identity as described herein. 
10. Here, I am referring not to exercises of identity that may be visible externally, such as wearing 
a turban; those types of expression are not projective in that they do not have any effect on 
how other individuals interact with one another or how the law applies to others.  Instead, 
they are intended only to convey or signify something about the individual’s identity to 
others.  While the wearing of religious garb by some individuals may indirectly affect the 
identity formation of others, such a result is more akin to the downstream consequences that 
may arise from any action, no matter how small.  As noted in note 200 and accompanying 
text, those types of consequences are not captured by the projective category. 
11. See Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Identity as Proxy, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1605, 1669 (2015) 
[hereinafter Lucas, Identity as Proxy] (explaining that identity “serve[s] to define one’s place 
in the world and in relation to other individuals,” while law “is a system designed to negotiate 
relationships between individuals and groups”); Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Undoing Race? 
Reconciling Multiracial Identity With Equal Protection, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1243, 1291–92 
(2014) [hereinafter Lucas, Undoing Race?] (arguing against conflation of identity and legal 
doctrine, given the different aims of each). 
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Because of their outward focus, the claims of religious freedom asserted 
in cases involving the refusal to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples or 
to provide such couples with related wedding services constitute an improper 
exercise of religious identity.  Within the realm of religion and the First 
Amendment, identity is and should be protected in the sense that individuals, 
either alone or as part of a community, can define their own religious identity, 
associate with others who share the same religious identity, and engage in 
practices that are fundamental to maintaining that identity.  These may in-
clude practices that are visible to others or are performed in public, as long as 
they do not imply anything about the relationship between non-identifying 
individuals and the state.  Individuals may need to engage in certain actions or 
rituals that are conveyed outward to maintain a distinctive identity.  Yet when 
those acts involve attempts to impose one’s identity on others or to displace le-
gal mechanisms intended to effectuate the rights of others, identity has trans-
gressed its necessary boundaries. 
For example, in the case of the clerk who refuses to issue a same-sex marriage 
license, identity is serving an impermissible projective role.  The clerk is utilizing 
her religious identity to obstruct operation of the law that allows same-sex 
individuals to be married and permits the state to recognize that legal rela-
tionship.  By nature of her position, she facilitates the law’s operation as ap-
plied to other individuals, but she is not one of the parties directly affected by 
the law,12 nor does the law require her to engage in the objectionable practice 
herself, such as by marrying an individual of the same sex.13  Although the law 
may run contrary to her religious identity, it does so only as it applies to others.  
The only direct effect on the clerk is a challenge to a particular aspect of her re-
ligious identity: her view of how other individuals should relate to one anoth-
er.14  The First Amendment does not, and should not, be interpreted to protect 
  
12. See Douglas Laycock, Afterword to SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: 
EMERGING CONFLICTS 200 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008) (“Religious dissenters can 
live their own values, but not if they occupy choke points that empower them to prevent 
same-sex couples from living their own values.  If the dissenters want complete moral 
autonomy on this issue, they must refrain from occupying such a choke point.”). 
13. In her dissent in Hobby Lobby, Justice Ginsburg emphasized this point, writing that “[t]he 
requirement [that companies provide certain insurance coverage] carries no command that 
Hobby Lobby . . . purchase or provide the contraceptives they find objectionable.”  Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2799 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  This 
stands in contrast to other religious exercise claims, which contend that the law is either 
preventing the individual from practicing her religion or requiring the individual to herself 
engage in a practice that would undermine her religious identity. 
14. While the religious objector is a party to the antidiscrimination laws implicated by the same-
sex marriage clerk example, the claimants referenced herein and described in more detail in 
Part II.B do not appear to be objecting to the mere fact that individuals are members of a 
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the individual’s ability to project her religious identity onto others, including 
the government, or to empower the claimant to construct the world—and rela-
tionships between other individuals—in such a way that it comports with her re-
ligious identity. 
A more difficult example is presented by those who do not facilitate state 
action—as in the role of a court clerk—but instead wish to be exempted from 
antidiscrimination laws in the provision of private services (such as the pho-
tographer who refuses to photograph a same-sex wedding).  As discussed in 
Part III.C, the primary issue with this sort of religious exemption—aside from 
the fact that the service provider is not being compelled to participate in the 
objected-to activity directly—is that it obstructs the proper operation of the 
law (antidiscrimination law) as applied to others (same-sex couples).  This type 
of interference is distinguishable from the downstream consequences that may 
flow from any exemption an individual in society might seek15—including 
those that may present a larger problem in the aggregate or affect the ultimate 
effectiveness of a law’s implementation.  Here, religious identity operates di-
rectly to supersede law—not just for the individual, but also for others not 
claiming or desiring any exemption. 
The aim of this Article is to distinguish inward-focused (protective) and 
outward-focused or other-regarding (projective) exercises of religious identity, 
arguing that protective exercises should be cognizable under the Free Exercise 
Clause, while projective ones should not.  Though protective claims of reli-
gious identity often may be satisfied effectively through accommodation of the 
individual or a defined group, projective claims necessarily entail application to 
  
sexual orientation minority, but instead specifically to the fact that they are seeking to be 
married.  Moreover, in the example of the clerk working in the marriage licensing office, the 
only relevance of her role vis-à-vis the couple is that she is a facilitator of the couples’ exercise 
of their right to be married. 
15. An example of such a consequence may be the fear that if one employee is exempted on 
religious grounds from working for a weapons producer, and other employees seek a similar 
exemption, it may affect the overall ability to produce munitions needed for war.  See infra 
note 201 and accompanying text.  Another example, which has garnered much attention, is 
the concern that by seeking exemptions from vaccination laws, religious objectors increase the 
likelihood that non-religious objectors will contract certain diseases.  Christopher Ogolla, 
The Public Health Implications of Religious Exemptions: A Balance Between Public Safety and 
Personal Choice, or Religion Gone Too Far?, 25 HEALTH MATRIX 257, 258–59 (2015) 
(observing that “religious groups’ opposition to the use of condoms in the developing world 
has been associated with the increased spread of HIV and AIDS”); id. at 260 (noting 
concerns that “[e]xemptions—religious or otherwise—are dangerous and put individuals at 
risk for contracting potentially debilitating and deadly infectious diseases” (alteration in 
original) (quoting EVERY CHILD BY TWO, RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS FACT SHEET, 
http://www.vaccinateyourbaby.org/pdfs/religion_exemptions_fact_sheet.pdf)). 
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non-identifying individuals and may even infringe on their ability to exercise 
their own religious identity. 
Part I of the Article provides some background on the relationship be-
tween law and identity, and religious identity in particular.  Part I.A elaborates 
on the thesis regarding the proper relationship between law and identity that 
has emerged from my earlier work.  It suggests that the same lens might be ap-
plied to the religious freedom context and may thus provide a foundation to 
delineate the boundary between law and religious identity.  Part I.B explains 
what is meant by “religious identity” and how it not only defines the individual, 
but also helps the individual relate to the world.  It also elaborates on the impli-
cations of allowing religious identity to be exercised externally as well as inter-
nally.  Acknowledging that law and identity are co-constitutive, it emphasizes 
that certain uses of identity may not merely influence the law and its applica-
tion to the individual, but also improperly interfere with the law’s application 
to others.16 
Part II explores the existing relationship between the courts and religious 
identity, including the courts’ hesitance to define religious identity in an overly 
restrictive manner (as courts have become similarly hesitant to define other 
forms of identity, including race).  Applying a threshold inquiry relating to the 
way in which identity is being exercised would eliminate the necessity for such 
inquiries in some cases.17  Moreover, to the extent the U.S. Supreme Court has 
protected religious identity as distinct from religious practices or customs, it 
has done so primarily with regard to inward-focused exercises of religious 
identity.18  Thus, much of existing Religion Clause jurisprudence is consistent 
with the thesis articulated in this Article.19 
Part III demonstrates how the recently asserted free exercise claims highlight-
ed at the outset of this Article, relating to same-sex marriage licenses and health 
insurance contraceptive coverage, might be understood through the protective-
projective identity lens.  Many of the claims made in earlier cases can be viewed 
as protective, meaning that the law is either compelling individuals to act 
  
16. See infra notes 81–85 and accompanying text. 
17. See Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 
102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 948 (1989) (explaining the author’s assertion that the application of 
“a restrictive doctrine at the threshold of claims” diminishes the need for “inquiries into 
sincerity, religiosity, and state interest frequently demanded by current free exercise norms”). 
18. See infra Part III.A. 
19. There is also potential in the protective-projective distinction to alleviate some of the tension 
between Free Exercise and Establishment Clause jurisprudence, as described in Part III.B.  
Both lines of jurisprudence might be seen (and thus reconciled) as prohibiting projective 
exercises of identity. 
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counter to their religious identity or preventing them from acting in compli-
ance with it.  In those cases, the law might be perceived as impermissibly enter-
ing the personal sphere and interfering with the individual’s ability to pursue a 
religious identity even within the confines of that sphere—for example, if the 
law were to dictate where she must attend school or whom she must marry.  
While the claimants in the more recent cases also maintain that the law is re-
quiring them to act in contravention of their religious identity, or that they are 
forced to be complicit in objectionable behavior, their claims are projective: 
The only harm they suffer directly is to the aspect of their religious identity 
that offers a specific conception of how the world should be.  And more im-
portant to this Article’s thesis, they are attempting to avoid complicity not just 
by exempting themselves from such activity, but also by displacing the law as it 
relates to others.  By asserting their religious freedom, they are attempting to 
impose their own worldview or framework of religious identity on others or 
the government, and thus to project identity into the sphere of law.20 
Religion is often touted as different from other bases of legal protection 
because it is specifically mentioned in, and thus explicitly protected by, the 
Constitution.  But it is not clear, as others have argued, that religion should be 
treated as unique or as an anomaly with regard to its treatment under the law, 
even in light of its specific inclusion in the constitutional text.21  Thus, in the 
religion context, as in other settings, the boundaries between law and identity 
should be carefully policed.  To the extent these more recent claims of religious 
  
20. Relatedly, Frederick Mark Gedicks has suggested that a primary reason for the controversy 
surrounding Indiana’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) was the Act’s protection 
of religious practices that impose costs on others in traditionally public spaces.  Frederick 
Mark Gedicks, Public, Private, Religious? Religious Freedom Restoration Acts in the U.S. States, 
3 QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI 772, 772 (2015).  
21. See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 6 (2007) (noting that the concept of “Equal Liberty . . . denies that 
religion is a constitutional anomaly, a category of human experience that demands special 
benefits and/or necessitates special restrictions”); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm 
Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK 
L.J. 555, 559–60 (1998) (“The mere fact that a free exercise right is enumerated in the 
constitutional text does not mean that holders of the right are constitutionally entitled to be 
excused from complying with government action that incidentally burdens the right.”); see 
also Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and the Purposes of 
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619, 639 (2015) (acknowledging that religion 
may deserve special treatment in the context of some laws, but exploring whether the same is 
true in the context of antidiscrimination laws, which aim to “dismantl[e] longstanding 
structures of dominance and subordination”).  In this Article, I do not address the larger 
debate regarding whether religious rights should in fact be treated as unique or whether their 
explicit inclusion in the First Amendment suggests as much.  I argue only that insofar as 
religious rights relate to identity, we might think of them as we do other constitutional rights. 
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exercise are projections of identity,22 they should not be cognizable under the 
Constitution. 
I. RIGHTS AND IDENTITY 
Identity and the law—and rights in particular—have a complicated rela-
tionship.23  While law and identity inevitably inform one another, they ulti-
mately serve different purposes:24 Identity might be conceived as the way in 
which one defines oneself and relates to the world (or to the law); in contrast, 
law is a mechanism for regulating relationships among individuals and 
groups, as well as between individuals or groups and the state.25  In the context 
of identity-based jurisprudence, tension can arise when the law attempts to 
frame its regulation of society around a particular notion of identity—one that 
may not align with the individual’s conception of identity.  One way to recon-
cile this tension is to recognize the individual’s authority over the definition 
and maintenance of identity within the individual or internal sphere, while 
simultaneously acknowledging the law’s superiority in the external sphere (in-
cluding the possible need to conceive of or use identity in a different manner 
than in the individual sphere).26 
  
22. See Gedicks, supra note 20, at 774 (describing the use of state RFRAs to “justify a projection 
of religious values from the quintessentially private space of home, church, and family into 
quintessentially public spaces”); see also Robin Fretwell Wilson, Bargaining for Religious 
Accommodations: Same-Sex Marriage and LGBT Rights After Hobby Lobby, in THE RISE OF 
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 263 (Micah Schwartzman et al. eds., 2016) (noting that 
as specific religious freedom exemptions “move beyond private religious spaces, the number 
of states willing to enact a given exemption drops off—in part because of concerns about 
hardship to same-sex couples”). 
23. Earlier articles of mine have explored the nature of this relationship in the context of other 
identities, namely race and gender.  See, e.g., Lauren Sudeall Lucas, A Dilemma of Doctrinal 
Design: Rights, Identity, and the Work-Family Conflict, 8 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 379, 403–04 
(2013) (explaining how a rights-based framework may have limited utility for and constrict 
identity formation or development); see also Lucas, Identity as Proxy, supra note 11 (arguing 
for an alternative to identity-based legal frameworks); Lucas, Undoing Race?, supra note 11 
(discussing the relationship between multiracial identity and equal protection doctrine).  
24. For an interesting discussion of how forcing religious disputes into the context of litigation 
may distort religious tradition, see M. Cathleen Kaveny, Law, Religion, and Conscience in a 
Pluralistic Society: The Case of the Little Sisters of the Poor (Bos. Coll. Law Sch. Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 394) (manuscript at 10), http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2756148 [https://perma.cc/BAZ3-BK8D] (suggesting 
that positions adopted for purposes of litigation are seen by some as “not to be taken seriously 
as actual statements of moral or theological beliefs”). 
25. See sources cited supra note 11. 
26. See infra Part I.A. 
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In this Article, I consider how that general thesis about law and identity 
might apply in the context of religious freedom, in light of increased emphasis 
on the ability of religious identity to trump secular law.27  In doing so, I operate 
from the premise that religious identity is worthy of protection, although I 
stop short of fully engaging in the debate of precisely how special such protec-
tion should be.  Religious identity is distinguishable from other forms of iden-
tity not only because it is referenced explicitly (in some form) in the First 
Amendment, but also because it often also encompasses a distinct worldview 
and ideas of how individuals and groups (both internal and external to that 
identity) should relate to one another.  Thus, the potential for conflict is even 
more explicit: If we bestow constitutional protection on religious identity, how 
are we to reconcile two competing visions—the religious and the secular—
about how individuals should relate to one another?28  The question of what it 
means to protect identity becomes even more complicated when the very no-
tion of religious identity encompasses a view of how others should conduct 
themselves in society. 
In this Part, I suggest that thinking about religious identity in the way we 
think about other forms of identity may provide a useful perspective on this di-
lemma.29  Part I.A describes the larger thesis regarding the relationship be-
tween rights and identity that has emerged from my earlier work on race and 
gender, which is that identity is best understood as a personal phenomenon, 
while the law’s primary focus should be on governing relationships between 
individuals.  For that reason, we should be wary of conflating the notions of 
identity and law or allowing identity to serve too prominent a role in law.  Part 
I.B explores in more detail the nature of religious identity and explains why 
there is inherent tension between religious identity and the role of law.  Taken 
  
27. See Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Conscience Wars in Transnational Perspective: Religious 
Liberty, Third-Party Harm, and Pluralism, in THE CONSCIENCE WARS: RETHINKING THE 
BALANCE BETWEEN RELIGION, IDENTITY, AND EQUALITY (Susanna Mancini & Michel 
Rosenfeld eds.) (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 4) (on file with author) (describing the 
“spread and evolution of conscience claims in recent decades, in the United States”).  
28. As Winnifred Sullivan, a prominent scholar of religion and the law, has observed: “At a very 
profound level, religion competes with law—and also, perhaps more importantly, with 
science and a scientistic reading of law—for comprehensive explanation and control.  Religion 
challenges the rule of law.”  WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 155–56 (2005). 
29. The treatment of religion in civil rights statutes supports the notion that we might think of 
religious identity as representative of who someone is and as similar to other types of identity, 
rather than just a collection of practices or beliefs detached from the individual.  Title VII, 
which prohibits discrimination on the basis of multiple identities, including race, color, 
religion, sex, and national origin, is an example of such a statute.  Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2) (2012). 
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together, these two Parts provide a foundation for distinguishing between per-
missible (protective) and impermissible (projective) uses of religious identity, as 
described in more detail in Part III. 
A. Rights and Identity: Race and Gender 
In my previous work, I explored the relationship between rights and 
identity, most often in the context of equal protection.  In doing so, I addressed 
several situations in which individualized conceptions of identity conflict with 
the goals of a larger legal framework.  In such situations, how can the need to 
allow individuals to define and manifest their own identity be reconciled with 
law’s need to organize and structure legal relationships based on identity?  One 
article I wrote in response to this question, Undoing Race?  Reconciling Multira-
cial Identity with Equal Protection,30 attempted to reconcile the tension that 
may arise between multiracial persons striving for legal recognition of an indi-
vidualized, self-descriptive notion of racial identity and a legal framework 
that uses broader, group-based notions of race to achieve structural racial 
equality.31  The very notion of racial classification as something that should be 
internally driven32 may be at odds with a legal framework focused on the ways in 
which race (as externally understood) serves as a force of subordination.33 
The danger suggested by Undoing Race is that notions of race that are in-
tegral to individual identity will be appropriated by larger social movements to 
displace legal arguments grounded in an understanding of race as it has operat-
ed in the broader context of society.34  This same danger is presented in more 
concrete form by the alignment between the multiracial movement and advo-
cates of colorblindness.35  In response, and to reconcile the tension described 
above, the article ultimately warns against conflating the “[individual’s] inter-
est in defining one’s own identity and the state’s interest in providing equal 
  
30. Lucas, Undoing Race?, supra note 11. 
31. Id. at 1280–84 (describing how group-based or anti-subordination approaches to equal 
protection may conflict with identity interests). 
32. Id. at 1260 (describing multiracial advocacy groups’ articulation of a right to claim a biracial 
or multiracial identity). 
33. Id. at 1283 (contrasting multiracial identity’s tendency to question race’s hold on the 
individual with anti-subordination’s view of race as a driving force of societal oppression). 
34. Id. at 1246 (suggesting that, among other possible effects, an undue focus on multiracial 
identity may crowd out “discussions about the continued realities of racism” and “fuel the 
ideology of colorblindness”). 
35. Id. at 1259–63 (describing unexpected alliances between advocates for recognition of 
multiracial identity and political conservatives aiming to minimize or eliminate the use of 
racial and ethnic categories). 
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protection of the law.”36  In other words, there may be a need to conceive of 
identity differently when the state is attempting to implement a larger social or 
political goal, such as equal protection, than when the primary concern is the 
vindication of one’s self-defined or self-assigned identity.37   
For example, I suggested that the need for the individual to vindicate her 
own conception of her racial identity may be served by allowing the individual 
to designate her race as “multiracial” or to mark one or more races (such as 
“white” and “black”) on the census form.  At the same time, the government 
should not recognize identity-based harm in the state’s decision to categorize 
the same individual as “black” for purposes of “determining which voting dis-
tricts are majority-minority or measuring the racial achievement gap in the 
context of education policy.”38  In other words, in the context of the law, indi-
vidual conceptions of identity should not be allowed to trump independently 
determined substantive goals.  Similarly, courts adjudicating religious identity 
claims should be wary of instances in which individuals use their religious 
identity to displace laws intended to govern relationships among everyone in 
society, including non-believers. 
For the reasons articulated in Undoing Race, and based on other harms 
that follow from an identity-based jurisprudence,39 I have also suggested that 
identity may not be the best basis for equal protection jurisprudence and pro-
posed an alternative framework.40  In the context of equal protection, identity 
serves as a proxy for the reasons we find certain types of discrimination particu-
larly pernicious—for example, the relationship to historical patterns of dis-
crimination or a lack of political power.  I have argued that the law should use 
those criteria, instead of relying on identity, as a means for distinguishing be-
tween permissible and impermissible forms of discrimination, rather than al-
lowing identity to play that role.41  By displacing identity from its traditional 
  
36. Id. at 1292 (“The endeavor to define and shape one’s identity as a person of multiracial 
heritage need not be equated with the way in which the Court has defined legal rights or 
entitlements under equal protection.”). 
37. Id. at 1296 (“[W]e should distinguish the means by which individuals are allowed to classify 
themselves and to structure their personal relationships from the question of how race is 
monitored by the state and how benefits will be distributed on the basis of race.”). 
38. Id. at 1298. 
39. Lucas, Identity as Proxy, supra note 11, at 1618–34 (outlining doctrinal, individual, and 
societal harms that may result from an identity-based jurisprudence, including difficulties 
encountered in defining identity categories; the tendency to privilege a dominant-identity 
narrative; failure to distinguish among the experiences of subgroups within larger identity categories; 
and psychological and emotional harm that can result from being forced to identify in a particular 
way to lay claim to legal protection). 
40. Id. at 1607–08. 
41. Id. at 1608–09. 
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role in equal protection jurisprudence, such a framework is arguably more ef-
fective in achieving its substantive goals.  And, more relevant for the purposes 
of this Article, this framework avoids using an internally focused, individual-
ized tool (identity) to achieve the substantive goals of an externally oriented 
structure that must apply to all, regardless of their conception of identity (law).  
It emphasizes the need to distinguish between law and identity and highlights 
as relevant for legal analysis only those aspects of identity indicative of social or 
political dynamics, such as historical discrimination or political powerlessness. 
Another aspect of the problematic relationship between rights and iden-
tity involves the negative effect that a rights-driven notion of identity may have 
on an individual in the gender context.42  For some of the same reasons dis-
cussed above, there may be tension between certain rights-based approaches to 
gender equality and more individualized notions of how members of different gen-
ders should relate to one another, particularly within the context of a family juggling 
various tasks and responsibilities.  For example, the rights framework may sug-
gest that men and women should be treated and thought of as the same (formal 
equality), though there remain clear differences between the sexes in the realm 
of identity.43  Ultimately, I concluded: “[T]he rights-based paradigm is not par-
ticularly instructive—and may actually be counterproductive—in thinking 
about how to actually structure one’s life or reconceptualize one’s identity after 
making the decision to have a child.”44 
Extrapolated to the relationship between law and identity as a more gen-
eral matter, one might conceive of the above articles as coalescing in the fol-
lowing thesis: While the law should strive to protect the definition and 
maintenance of self-conceived identity, and allow individuals to play some role 
in dictating how they relate personally to the law, individualized notions of 
identity should be protected or enforced only insofar as they relate to the indi-
vidual.  Because the law’s purpose is to govern relationships among individuals 
and groups, it may need to discard the vehicle of identity or utilize a different no-
tion of identity—one tailored to meet its own externally focused ends.45  While 
many of the legal issues posed by religious identity are distinct from those that 
arise in the context of race and gender, there is a common thread: Identity is a per-
sonal and often individual phenomenon, and allowing individual conceptions of 
  
42. See Lucas, supra note 23, at 381. 
43. See id. at 379. 
44. Id. at 381. 
45. As argued in Identity as Proxy, the law might eschew a basis in identity altogether, avoiding many of 
the problems discussed herein.  See Lucas, Identity as Proxy, supra note 11, at 1607–09. 
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identity to play too large a role in the law may not only be harmful to identity, 
but also distort the law’s ultimate purpose. 
B. Law and Religious Identity 
Working from the above premise—that we should be careful about con-
flating identity and the law given their divergent roles—there are still addi-
tional questions that arise in the context of religious identity.  Religious 
identity is unique from categories like race and gender not only because it is 
referenced specifically within the First Amendment, but also because it often 
encompasses a specific notion or worldview of how other individuals should 
relate to one another, as described in Part I.B.1 below.46 
Parts I.B.2 and I.B.3 explain why framing religion as a matter of identity 
causes problems in the legal context.  For example, the fact that identity is non-
negotiable means that applying the identity lens to claims of religious freedom 
leaves little room for political compromise.  Similarly, framing religious free-
dom claims as identity-based claims raises inevitable issues in the context of re-
ligious pluralism.  In a pluralistic society, where many religious identities must 
coexist, identity’s influence must be limited to the individual or community 
sphere; if religious identity is legally protected beyond that sphere, intractable 
conflict will inevitably result.  If, however, a distinction is drawn between pro-
tective and projective identity claims, and only the protective identity claims 
are honored, these problems lessen. 
1. The Nature of Religious Identity 
Identities have been defined as “the fundamental bases upon which so-
ciety, independent of the special and unique features of each individual, or-
ders and arranges its members.”47  Alternatively, one might think of identity 
as “an individuals’ sense of self, group affiliations, structural positions, and 
ascribed and achieved statuses.”48  Ultimately, identity serves as a link between 
  
46. While an acknowledgment that race and gender identity are socially constructed may imply 
that they embody some notion of how individuals relate to one another (such as 
hierarchically), the embodiment of that notion in the formation of identity is distinct from 
the use of religious identity to explicitly project views about how individuals should conduct 
themselves. 
47. Morris Rosenberg, The Self-Concept: Social Product and Social Force, in SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY: SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 593, 601 (Morris Rosenberg & Ralph H. 
Turner eds., 1981). 
48. Lori Peek, Becoming Muslim: The Development of a Religious Identity, 66 SOC. RELIGION 
215, 216–17 (2005).  
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“the individual conception of self and the larger social structure within which 
the individual thinks and acts.”49  One author has written that “[r]eligious beliefs 
. . . form a central part of a person’s belief structure, his inner self.  They define a 
person’s very being—his sense of who he is, why he exists, and how he should re-
late to the world around him.”50 
The role of religion in the formation of identity has largely been overlooked, 
with many social scientists focusing instead on gender, sexuality, race, and ethnic-
ity as primary sources of identity.51  Yet for many, religion plays a critical role in 
identity formation,52 particularly given the increasingly important role it plays 
in society.53  Religion serves as a vehicle through which individuals may adopt 
certain values; these values often serve as the “substantive cores of identit[y]”—
it makes someone who he or she is.54  Moreover, identity plays an important 
role in helping people make sense of the world and define reality.55  One can 
see, then, how laws and policies that do not comport with that definition or 
worldview create internal tension for religious objectors. 
Wendy Cadge and Lynn Davidman have observed that religious identity 
in the United States is a matter of both ascription and achievement, meaning 
that it is often viewed as a combination of something that is determined by 
birth and also the result of conscious choices made over the course of one’s 
life.56  To the extent some part of religious identity is seen as ascribed, it may be 
viewed as immutable and thus non-negotiable in the face of possible conflict.  
Others have argued that religious identity is primarily a matter of choice, and 
  
49. Id. at 217. 
50. Daniel O. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 
1113, 1164 (1988). 
51. Peek, supra note 48, at 217–18. 
52. Id. at 219 (“[F]or many individuals religion remains an important organizing factor in the 
hierarchy of identities that compose the self.”); see also C. MARGARET HALL, IDENTITY, 
RELIGION, AND VALUES: IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS 29 (1996) (“Because 
religious beliefs play a major role in defining human nature, as well as human identities, they 
exert particularly critical influences on individual and social behavior.”). 
53. Peek, supra note 48, at 219 (noting that membership in a religious organization can provide 
many secular material, psychological, and social benefits, such as community networks, 
economic opportunities, educational resources, and peer trust and support). 
54. HALL, supra note 52, at 30. 
55. Id. at 29–30. 
56. Wendy Cadge & Lynn Davidman, Ascription, Choice, and the Construction of Religious 
Identities in the Contemporary United States, 45 J. SCI. STUD. RELIGION 23, 24 (2006); see also 
Nancy T. Ammerman, Religious Identities and Religious Institutions, in HANDBOOK OF THE 
SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 207 (Michele Dillon ed., 2003) (noting that religious identities 
are either “ascribed (collectivity-based) or achieved (individual)”). 
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has become increasingly so in American society.57  Religious identity can also 
be understood to align with culture, heritage, or ethnicity, though it may not 
necessarily do so.58 
One aspect of religious identity is participating in holidays and rituals as-
sociated with a given religion.59  Thus, religious identity is different from other 
types of identity in that it may require engagement in certain actions or prac-
tices.60  This is why it is critical to religious identity that a member of a given 
religion be able to engage in such actions under the protections provided by the 
Free Exercise Clause.  Identity may also refer to cultural affiliation.61  Although 
some religious practices are observed in an individual capacity and others as part of a 
group, religious identity is often understood as the individual’s decision to affiliate 
religiously with a group of other individuals, all of whom subscribe to a similar set of 
beliefs and practices.62  Uniting that group is often a sense that “their communi-
ty is in sole possession of the truth.”63  In this sense, religious identity is unique: 
It may be the only identity in the context of the law that openly purports to 
have a monopoly on the understanding of how individuals should relate to one 
another.64  
  
57. Duane F. Alwin et al., Measuring Religious Identities in Surveys, 70 PUB. OPINION Q. 530, 
534 (2006) (“[R]eligious identities are ultimately a matter of choice.”); Cadge & Davidman, 
supra note 56, at 24 (noting “the current trend arguing that religion in the United States has 
dramatically changed from being based in ascription to being more a matter of personal 
choice”). 
58. Cadge & Davidman, supra note 56, at 27, 32–33 (describing the varied affiliations of 
individuals who identify as Buddhist and Jewish). 
59. Id. at 28. 
60. One’s identity as a member of a given race, in contrast, will not necessarily affect or dictate 
one’s actions.  But see Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1259, 1262 (2000) (articulating observations about performative identity—instances in 
which individuals may feel pressure to act in certain ways to counteract negative assumptions 
about their identities). 
61. Cadge & Davidman, supra note 56, at 35–36. 
62. Alwin et al., supra note 57, at 534 (explaining that religious identities are often constructed by 
identifying with a single religious community).  While individuals may not formally associate 
with religious organizations, they often still associate with a particular religious group.  See 
Cadge & Davidman, supra note 56, at 35. 
63. Alwin et al., supra note 57, at 534 (quoting JOHN P. HEWITT, DILEMMAS OF THE 
AMERICAN SELF 193 (1989)); see also JOHN H. BERTHRONG, THE DIVINE DELI: 
RELIGIOUS IDENTITY IN THE NORTH AMERICAN CULTURAL MOSAIC 47 (1999) 
(explaining that most religions claim to “tell the truth about reality”). 
64. This is aside from, of course, identities tied to political ideology.  Unlike political identities, 
however, religion is often grouped with identities based on race, color, and sex.  See, e.g., Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2) (2012). 
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In The Politics of Recognition, Charles Taylor links identity with, among 
other things, the notion of authenticity and the demand for recognition.65  Au-
thenticity suggests that each individual should live in a manner true to herself, 
while recognition suggests that others should be sensitive to the individual’s 
quest for authenticity.66  Thus, identity cannot be a wholly individualized phe-
nomenon; it often involves, or requires, a response from others that affirms its 
existence.67  Thus, as William Marshall has argued, individuals asserting reli-
gious freedom claims may do so to validate their religious identity as well as 
vindicate their legal arguments.68 
Courts have increasingly treated religious freedom as a matter of identity, 
in the sense that it is integral to the very notion of who one is.69  Noah Feldman 
has argued that, at least as to the Establishment Clause, the focus of the consti-
tutional right to religious freedom has shifted from religious liberty to political 
equality,70 thus likening religious identity to other forms of identity.  As Feldman 
explains, the First Amendment was born out of motivation “to protect the indi-
vidual from coercion at the hands of the state.”71  Over time, as the dangers from 
religious persecution have lessened72 and doctrinal tendencies toward individual-
ism have grown,73 the primary concern has become preventing the exclusion of 
  
65. Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE 
POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 28 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994). 
66. Id. at 28, 38; see also Jeremy Waldron, Cultural Identity and Civic Responsibility, in 
CITIZENSHIP IN DIVERSE SOCIETIES 155, 157 (Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman eds., 
2000).  
67. See infra note 218 and accompanying text. 
68. See infra notes 136–137. 
69. See Avigail Eisenberg, Religion as Identity (Aug. 4, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) 
(prepared for the 2014 Annual Meeting of the APSA), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1986713 
[https://perma.cc/L5KT-GCAJ] (describing a shift in western democracies from treating 
religious freedom as a matter of choice to regarding it as a matter of identity); see also supra 
note 29 and accompanying text (discussing Title VII). 
70. Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90 
CALIF. L. REV. 673, 676 (2002); see also EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 21, at 13 
(advancing a concept of “Equal Liberty,” which would require that “minority religious 
practices, needs, and interests must be as well and as favorably accommodated by government 
as are more familiar and mainstream interests”).  Elsewhere, however, I have argued against 
approaches that focus on comparative treatment.  See Lucas, Identity as Proxy, supra note 11, 
at 1663 (suggesting one problem with the comparative approach is that it allows solutions 
that withdraw benefits from all rather than provide them on an equal basis); id. at 1637 
(describing Peter Westen’s argument in The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 
(1982), that the comparative element of equal protection distracts from “the more important 
inquiry as to whether the underlying substantive right has been violated”). 
71. Feldman, supra note 70, at 675. 
72. Id. at 675–76. 
73. See Robert A. Holland, A Theory of Establishment Clause Adjudication: Individualism, Social 
Contract, and the Significance of Coercion in Identifying Threats to Religious Liberty, 80 CALIF. 
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religious minorities and easing the “psychological burdens of religious minority 
status.”74   
Similarly, Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager argue that the 
Constitution’s underlying purpose in protecting religion was to ensure equality 
of treatment among individuals of different religions.75  Because American ju-
risprudence often understands equality as treating people of different identities 
equally,76 it is not surprising that an increased focus on equality in the context 
of religious freedom has resulted in greater emphasis on identity.77  To the ex-
tent individuals of different religious backgrounds wish to exercise their right 
to religious freedom, it is no longer sufficient that they be protected from perse-
cution or merely allowed to pursue the practice of their religion.  Rather, they 
demand that their religious beliefs and worldviews be given adequate respect, 
even if that respect comes at a cost to others.78 
As I have argued in the context of multiracial identity,79 there are many 
reasons for maintaining a distinction between identity and law and, more spe-
cifically, for restricting identity’s relevance to the internal sphere.80  The most 
prominent among those reasons is the fact that law and identity serve different 
purposes.  As described above, identity is a critical part of the individual, as it 
helps to define one’s being and reason for existence, as well as the way in which 
one relates to the world.  Law, in contrast, is intended to govern relationships 
among individuals and groups, and the way in which individuals and groups 
  
L. REV. 1595, 1601 (1992) (describing the individualist tradition underlying 
constitutional protection of religious freedom).  A parallel trend toward individualism 
has pervaded equal protection doctrine as well.  See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, From 
Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 
120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1282–83 (2011) (noting the relationship between individualism and 
colorblindness in the U.S. Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence). 
74. Feldman, supra note 70, at 676. 
75. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 21, at 9 (“Missing from public discussion has been the 
idea that the Constitution expresses special concern for religion because and to the extent 
that religious difference inspires inequality in stature and reward, and accordingly, that the 
Constitution’s fundamental religion-specific goal is that of opposing discrimination.”). 
76. Lucas, Identity as Proxy, supra note 11, at 1607. 
77. See Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims 
in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2561 (2015) (describing the shift in religious 
freedom arguments from “speaking as a majority enforcing customary morality to speaking as 
a minority seeking exemptions based on religious identity”); see also infra Part III (discussing 
the plaintiffs’ (religious objectors) claims, in which they emphasize how their beliefs are an 
integral part of who they are). 
78. See infra Part III (examining plaintiffs’ (religious objectors) views in individual cases). 
79. See infra note 161. 
80. Lucas, Undoing Race?, supra note 11, at 1297 (arguing that the state has a relevant role to play 
in policing external perception of racial identity, but it need not control internal perceptions 
of racial identity, where the risk of identity harm is greatest). 
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relate to the state.  The values informing law will, by definition, often be dis-
tinct from those that inform identity. 
Of course, law and identity are often co-constitutive: law informs the cre-
ation of identity, and identity inevitably informs development of the law.81  As 
Eisgruber and Sager have observed: “The question is not whether the state 
should be permitted to affect religion or religion permitted to affect the state; the 
question is how they should be permitted to affect each other.”82  Yet the law does 
not exist solely to vindicate individual identity interests.  Thus, in the context 
of race or gender and an antidiscrimination jurisprudence that is organized 
around identity categories, it may sometimes be necessary for a larger group to 
assume one common identity for purposes of mandating equal treatment.83  
Similarly, it may be necessary in the religion context to marginalize some as-
pects of religious identity in the interest of creating a coherent jurisprudence 
for a religiously pluralistic society.  A response to this reality may be to create 
accommodations when necessary to preserve identity as exercised with a focus 
on the individual or group, but it need not mean that an individual of non-
conforming religious identity can use identity to obstruct the law from operat-
ing as it should with respect to other individuals. 
Some of the other reasons for maintaining a distinction between identity 
and the law may be more relevant to racial identity than they are to religious 
identity—for example, the argument that structuring doctrine around identity 
may force individuals to identify in a particular way in order to benefit from 
certain legal protections.84  There are still negative consequences, however, 
that flow from allowing religious identity to serve as a driving force in the con-
text of law.85  Those consequences are discussed below, in Parts I.B.2 and 
I.B.3. 
  
81. See IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 9–11 
(2006) (observing that identity and law are co-constitutive); Lucas, Identity as Proxy, supra 
note 11, at 1670 (same). 
82. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 21, at 7. 
83. For this reason, I have argued elsewhere that it may be desirable to eliminate the role that 
identity serves in the equal protection context, instead substituting for identity the 
substantive values identity is intended to serve in that context.  See Lucas, Identity as Proxy, 
supra note 11, at 1609. 
84. Lucas, Undoing Race?, supra note 11, at 1293. 
85. There may also be more at stake when protecting religious identity—in contrast to racial 
identity, for example—given the affirmative entitlements afforded by the First Amendment. 
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2. Identity as Non-Negotiable 
In one recent and now famous (or infamous) case, a court clerk named 
Kim Davis in Rowan County, Kentucky filed a lawsuit against the governor of 
Kentucky, claiming that he violated her rights by insisting that Davis issue 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples, and thus act in a manner contrary to her 
religious beliefs.86  Like many of the other litigants described in Part III.C, 
Davis indicated her Christian affiliation and involvement in her local church 
in her complaint.87  She referred repeatedly to her religious conscience rights, 
and she explicitly stated that her compliance with her beliefs constituted “reli-
gious exercise” protected by the Constitution.88  Davis further argued that 
Kentucky’s marriage policies, which allow same-sex marriage, made it “impos-
sible” for her to comply both with her religious beliefs and her role as clerk in 
administering such policies.89 
It may be the attempt to tether these claims to identity itself that makes 
them so non-negotiable.  As Daniel Weinstock has written: “[R]egardless of 
the actual intentions of the agents that put them forward, claims formulated in 
terms of identity convey the impression that their proponents are reluctant to 
compromise.”90  Weinstock defines identity arguments as those that “defend[] 
a position on a given political issue by invoking the consequences this position 
has for the identity of the individual or the group in question.”91  He further 
explains that such arguments are often made in terms of values and interests, 
and that when identity is invoked it functions as shorthand for these values and 
interests.92   
Weinstock contends that identity arguments are problematic in the con-
text of democratic debate because they transform normative discussion about 
political disagreements into “you should accept my position because it is central 
to my identity” arguments.93  Moreover, identity arguments are not falsifiable 
  
86. Verified Third-Party Complaint of Defendant Kim Davis at 2, Davis v. Beshear, No. 15-cv-
00044-DLB (E.D. Ky. Aug. 4, 2015). 
87. Id. at 7. 
88. Id. at 11, 14, 16, 19. 
89. Id. at 25. 
90. Daniel Weinstock, Is ‘Identity’ a Danger to Democracy?, in IDENTITY, SELF-
DETERMINATION AND SECESSION 15, 20 (Igor Primoratz & Aleksandar Pavković, eds., 
2006).  Weinstock later concludes: “If democracy requires compromise, and identity 
arguments make them more difficult to achieve, democratic institutions should seek to 
minimize the occurrence of such arguments.”  Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 22. 
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and thus, when used by individuals like the plaintiff above, they appear to offer 
only one possible solution.94  As Jeremy Waldron has observed: “When I say 
that some issue is crucial to my identity, I present my view of that issue (my in-
terests in it, my needs, my preferences) as both interpersonally and socially 
non-negotiable: I imply that accommodating my interests, needs, or prefer-
ences in this matter is crucial to respecting me.”95 
All of this begs the question whether religion is unique in its relation to 
identity.  Does the Constitution recognize something special about religion 
that would or should make identity claims raised in that context more powerful 
than those raised in other contexts?  This Article responds in the negative.96  It 
suggests that the same limits I have applied to other identity-based claims 
should also apply to those made under the guise of the Religion Clauses: Indi-
vidual or group conceptions of religious identity should not trump law in the 
external sphere. 
3. Identity and Religious Pluralism 
William Marshall suggests that the view of “religion as identity” is trou-
bling because religious affiliation suggests the definition of outsiders.97  Thus, 
this notion is as much about protecting the group against non-believers as it is 
about protecting the ability to associate with other believers.  Given the exclu-
sive nature of religious identity and its non-negotiable character, it can also be 
difficult to reconcile the protection of individual identity with societal plural-
ism, including religious pluralism.  As noted in Part I.B.1, most religions claim 
to “tell the truth about reality,”98 yet most would also posit that only one truth ex-
ists.  The United States is undoubtedly a religiously pluralistic society.  Because 
many religions claim a monopoly on the truth,99 intractable conflicts will abound 
  
94. Weinstock writes that an individual may perceive being asked to compromise an aspect of her 
identity as more harmful than being “asked merely to sacrifice one of her preferences or only 
partially realize one of her values.”  Id. at 21. 
95. Waldron, supra note 66, at 158–59. 
96. Eisgruber and Sager agree.  See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 21, at 11. 
97. Marshall, supra note 9, at 397. 
98. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
99. I acknowledge the distinction between Protestant and other religious models or traditions.  
See, e.g., SULLIVAN, supra note 28, at 8 (contrasting Protestant and Catholic models of 
church and state relations).  For purposes of this Article, I have chosen not to emphasize this 
distinction, in part because the points made herein could be relevant to all models.  To the 
extent some of the arguments made herein are more relevant to the Protestant tradition, it is 
likely fitting, given the focus on the First Amendment and dominance of that model in the 
United States.  Id. at 7 (“[T]he modern religio-political arrangement has been largely, 
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if the law allows religious identity to radiate outward and influence an otherwise 
secular system of law.100  
Jeremy Waldron presents a hypothetical scenario that can be altered 
slightly to demonstrate how multiple religious identities cannot govern simul-
taneously within the context of the law.  He writes: 
Let me illustrate with a crude example.  In response to the enduring 
question of what rules are to be set up to govern the organization of 
families and households, culture A may answer ‘Polygyny’, culture B 
may answer ‘Polyandry’, and culture C may answer ‘Monogamy’.  If 
the larger society S (which includes individuals who identify as As, 
Bs, and Cs) opts for monogamy, then clearly it is opting for an answer 
which directly contradicts the answer given in A (not to mention the 
answer given in B). . . . My point is that these solutions are rivals: 
they constitute alternative and competing answers to what is basi-
cally the same question.101 
Imagine a slight alteration to the above example: 
In response to the question of what legal regime is to be set up to 
govern marriage, religion A may answer ‘polygamy,’ religion B may 
answer ‘one man-one woman,’ and religion C may answer ‘monog-
amy, without regard to sex.’  If the larger society S (which includes 
individuals who identify as As, Bs, and Cs) opts to allow any mar-
riage between any two individuals (including same-sex marriage), 
then clearly it is opting for an answer which directly contradicts the 
answer given in A (not to mention the answer given in B). . . . My 
point is that these solutions are rivals: they constitute alternative 
and competing answers to what is basically the same question. 
One clear distinction between the two examples is that the variation on 
the first example implicates the right to free exercise of religion, while there is 
no comparable constitutional right that protects the right to culture.  One 
might also argue as this Article does, however, that cultural or identity-based 
aspects of religion are not entitled to protection when directed outside the in-
ternal sphere.  Waldron ultimately suggests that, if available, the solution of 
  
although not exclusively, indebted, theologically and phenomenologically, to protestant 
reflection and culture.  Particularly in its American manifestation.” (footnotes omitted)). 
100. NeJaime and Siegel explain that while accommodation may often be conceived of as a way to 
promote pluralism, “[e]xemption regimes that (1) accommodate objections to direct and 
indirect participation in actions of other citizens who do not share the objectors’ beliefs, and 
(2) exhibit indifference to the impact of widespread exemptions on other citizens, do not 
promote pluralism; they sanction and promote the objectors’ commitments.”  NeJaime & 
Siegel, supra note 27, at 3. 
101. Waldron, supra note 66, at 161. 
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accommodation would be a reasonable one.102  Accommodation does not di-
rectly address, however, claims made by individuals refusing to issue marriage 
licenses or provide wedding-related services.  This is because the complainants 
in these cases are not seeking accommodation of their own behavior, but rather 
of their identity as it relates to others’ behavior. 
Under a regime that allows men and women to marry, individuals from 
group B can engage in behavior that aligns with their belief system.  As to the 
Bs, then, there is no issue with regard to liberty.  But S’s decision to forge ahead 
with a scheme that adopts C’s view rather than B’s may trigger equality con-
cerns (see Feldman’s argument in Part I.B.1) or present a challenge to Bs in 
that they are then forced to live within a society and conform to a legal regime 
that does not mesh with their own set of values or vision of how the rules 
should operate.  Thus, it is not immediately clear how S would or could ac-
commodate group B’s religious identity.  As Waldron observes: “[I]f respect 
for an individual also requires respect for the culture in which his identity has 
been formed, and if that respect is demanded in the uncompromising and 
non-negotiable way in which respect for rights is demanded, then the task 
may become very difficult indeed . . . .”103 
Imagine that a white supremacy group wishes to meet regularly and pro-
mote within the group the belief system that the white race is supreme to all 
other races.  Suppose further that such a group sees nothing objectionable 
about engaging in behavior that discriminates against or denigrates members 
of a lesser race.  They would likely harbor objections to the legal regime society 
has chosen, which includes antidiscrimination laws, affirmative action pro-
grams, and harsher penalties for crimes motivated by race.  The ability of that 
group to associate and to select its own values may be protected as a constitu-
tional matter, yet such a group would not be exempted from the hate crime 
laws simply because their view of what the rules should be conflicts with socie-
ty’s chosen view. 
Assuming Eisgruber and Sager are correct that all claims based in religiosi-
ty clearly cannot claim complete immunity from compliance with the law,104 a 
line delineating those that are worthy of protection from those that are unworthy 
must be drawn.  In other words, the sole fact that clerk Kim Davis’s objection 
  
102. Id. at 162. 
103. Id. at 160. 
104. I agree with Eisgruber and Sager that the Free Exercise Clause cannot be understood to “give 
religiously motivated persons a presumptive right to disobey the law.”  EISGRUBER & 
SAGER, supra note 21, at 11.  Yet that realization only returns us to the same basic inquiry: 
how to demarcate constitutional claims of religious freedom from those that are 
unconstitutional. 
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to issuing same-sex marriage licenses is grounded in religious belief cannot be 
sufficient to automatically earn her an exemption; otherwise, there would be 
no limit to such First Amendment arguments.  One route is to assess or ques-
tion the sincerity of her claim (which she emphasizes as well), while another is 
to delve within the religious faith at issue to determine how critical the belief or 
practice is to adhering to the faith.  Such approaches would be objectionable 
given the personal nature of religious belief and its central role to the individual, 
as described in Part I.B.1.  It would also likely offend those of the religious faith 
under scrutiny.  
Another approach, adopted by many religious freedom restoration acts, is 
to ask whether the law imposes a substantial burden on a sincerely held reli-
gious belief (and whether it constitutes the least restrictive means of achieving 
its purpose).105  The argument made here is not to focus on the nature of the re-
ligion, on the mere fact that religious belief is at issue, or on the extent to which 
religious belief is burdened; nor is it, as Eisgruber and Sager argue, to concen-
trate on Davis’s treatment relative to those of other religious faiths.  These are 
inquiries that may become necessary at some point, but this Article suggests 
that a preliminary threshold inquiry—focused on the way in which religion is 
being used—may render some claims infeasible from the outset.  In other 
words, if one assumes that the sphere of activity protected by the First 
Amendment does not encompass projective claims of religious identity, the 
other inquiries are avoidable as to those claims. 
II. THE COURTS AND RELIGIOUS IDENTITY 
Because religious identity is such a deeply personal matter, courts have 
been hesitant to conscript too narrow a definition of religion.  In the context of 
certain claims—for example, those relating to religious practices that, if not 
protected by the First Amendment, may otherwise be rendered illegal—the 
definition of religion is unavoidable.  Yet the idea that identity is something 
that should be protected only within a more limited, individual realm is not an 
unfamiliar concept to the courts in the constitutional law context.  Linking the 
treatment of identity with that of religious freedom may be one way to distin-
guish the protection provided to religion in earlier cases and also to create nec-
essary boundaries for emergent religious freedom claims.  This Part describes 
the judiciary’s reluctance to define the specific contours of religion and its implicit 
acknowledgement, visible throughout the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, 
  
105. See generally Gedicks, supra note 20. 
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that while identity requires protection as a personal matter, it may warrant less 
protection outside of that sphere. 
A. Avoiding the Definition of Religious Identity 
Although many commentators have argued that the courts should not 
define religion, the text of the First Amendment would seem to beg definition 
of the term.106  Courts have struggled on this point, vacillating between broad 
and narrow definitions.  When the Supreme Court began to address the defi-
nition of religion in the late nineteenth century, it indicated that “[t]he ‘reli-
gion’ valued by the First Amendment . . . was the sort of theistic belief widely 
recognized and long revered by mainstream America—and nothing more.”107  
The Court’s approach to religion was not only theistic, but focused more spe-
cifically on a mainstream Christian understanding of religion—revolving 
around the notion of a Creator who required obedience to his will and adher-
ence to a particular sense of morality.108   
As American religious life became increasingly diverse, the Court’s con-
ception of religion evolved to encompass a broader definition.  In United States 
v. Ballard,109 for example, the Court “offered the possibility that nontheistic 
faiths would be entitled to [F]irst [A]mendment protection . . . .”110  In doing 
so, the Court appeared to emphasize “generic areas of religious belief—life after 
death, for example—rather than specific beliefs—faith in a supreme being, for ex-
ample—that must be held in order for the belief system to be considered reli-
gious.”111  The Court’s 1961 decision in Torcaso v. Watkins112 further endorsed 
the notion that the Court had adopted a nontheistic definition of religion.  In 
Torcaso, the Court included under its definition of religion “Buddhism, Taoism, 
  
106. SULLIVAN, supra note 28, at 3 (“Courts need some way of deciding what counts as religion if 
they are to enforce these laws.”); Jeffrey Omar Usman, Defining Religion: The Struggle to 
Define Religion Under the First Amendment and the Contributions and Insights of Other 
Disciplines of Study Including Theology, Psychology, Sociology, the Arts, and Anthropology, 83 
N.D. L. REV. 123, 145, 149 (2007) (noting that “a number of commentators have argued 
that religion should not, or even cannot, be defined by the courts” but also that, ultimately, 
“religion must be defined”). 
107. David D. Meyer, Self-Definition in the Constitution of Faith and Family, 86 MINN. L. REV. 
791, 811 (2002). 
108. Usman, supra note 106, at 167–68. 
109. 322 U.S. 78 (1944). 
110. Sherryl E. Michaelson, Note, Religion and Morality Legislation: A Reexamination of 
Establishment Clause Analysis, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 301, 322 (1984). 
111. Id.  
112. 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
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Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others” that did not embrace “what 
would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God.”113 
In two cases arising from statutory interpretation of a conscientious objector 
provision,114 the Court provided a more affirmative definition of religion.  At issue 
in United States v. Seeger115 was the constitutionality of a statutory provision defin-
ing “religious training and belief” as “an individual’s belief in a relation to a Su-
preme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, 
but [not including] essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a 
merely personal moral code.”116  The Court interpreted the U.S. Congress’s de-
cision to use the term “Supreme Being” rather than “God” to apply an inclusive 
approach toward all religions, while excluding political, sociological, or philo-
sophical views.117  Ultimately, the Seeger Court adopted the following test of 
belief “in a relation to a Supreme Being”: “whether a given belief that is sincere 
and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled 
by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemp-
tion.”118  In Welsh v. United States,119 another case interpreting the same provi-
sion, a plurality of the Court held that to qualify as a conscientious objector 
within the meaning of the statute, an objector need not believe in “God,” but 
could instead possess “moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right 
and wrong [that are] held with the strength of traditional religious convic-
tions.”120 
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,121 returning to the constitutional realm, the Court 
cast the definition of religious identity as unavoidable.  In Yoder, the Court ap-
peared to retreat from a more expansive view of religion, holding that a “way of 
  
113. Id. at 495 n.11. 
114. The statutory provision at issue—Section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service 
Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j)—exempted from service in the armed forces those who were 
opposed to participation in war based on their “religious training and belief.”  Welsh v. 
United States, 398 U.S. 333, 335 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 164–65 
(1965).  Although Seeger and Welsh involved construction of a statutory provision’s terms, 
they “have had and continue to have a significant influence on how courts approach and 
understand what religion means for purposes of the First Amendment.”  Usman, supra note 
106, at 172. 
115. 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
116. Id. at 165 (alteration in original). 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 166. 
119. 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
120. Id. at 340 (“If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely ethical or moral 
in source and content but that nevertheless impose upon him a duty of conscience to refrain 
from participating in any war at any time, those beliefs certainly occupy in the life of that 
individual ‘a place parallel to that filled by . . . God’ in traditionally religious persons.”). 
121. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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life” would not necessarily be sufficient to amount to religious belief.122  Chief 
Justice Burger wrote: “Although a determination of what is a ‘religious’ belief 
or practice entitled to constitutional protection may present a most delicate 
question, the very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to 
make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has 
important interests.”123  With regard to the Amish, the group at issue in the 
case, the Court concluded that their belief system was “not merely a matter of 
personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by an orga-
nized group, and intimately related to daily living.”124  Critical to the Court’s 
assessment of the Amish faith was its reliance on the Biblical text, adoption by 
an organized group, longevity, and close connection to daily life.125 
With this limited and uncertain guidance from the Supreme Court, low-
er federal and state courts have been left to provide more detailed direction as 
to what will constitute religion for purposes of the First Amendment.126  As 
Jeffrey Usman has explained, courts have responded in varying ways to the 
“discussion of the existence of religion as internal or external, individualistic or 
communal . . . .”:127 
First, [some courts make] a broad declaration . . . that religion may 
exist without any formal external or communal signs of traditional 
religions such as formal services, ceremony, presence of clergy, 
structure or organization, propagation efforts, holidays being ob-
served, and other similar activities.  Second, courts refuse to allow 
religion to become a limitless self-defining category or classifica-
tion.  Third, courts consider the sincerity of the religious belief of 
the party, which is sometimes termed the devotional component of 
the definition of religion.  Fourth, the courts look to communal and 
external elements as proof of the sincerity of the person’s belief.  
Fifth, even if this belief is sincerely held, many courts include these 
external and communal elements as factors in determining whether 
the belief is religious.128 
  
122. Id. at 215 (“A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier 
to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely secular considerations; to 
have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief.”). 
123. Id. at 215–16. 
124. Id. at 216. 
125. Id. 
126. Usman, supra note 106, at 173 (“None of these [U.S. Supreme Court] decisions offer a 
commanding pronouncement of what the law is, instead they serve only as loose guidance for 
the state courts and lower federal courts.”). 
127. Id. at 211. 
128. Id. 
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Although courts have made many attempts to define religion, some of 
which are described above, others have concluded that “defining religion ob-
jectively is difficult or impossible.”129  As Justice Frankfurter observed in West 
Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette:130 “Certainly this Court cannot be 
called upon to determine what claims of conscience should be recognized and 
what should be rejected as satisfying the ‘religion’ which the Constitution pro-
tects.”131  Although determining the definition of religion may be unavoidable, 
given the term’s inclusion in the constitutional text and the need to ascertain 
when accommodation is required, there are other limits that can be imposed 
on its reach that relate to the way in which religion is used and protected re-
gardless of its substantive definition.132  The framework articulated in this Ar-
ticle, which distinguishes between claims that aim to protect identity as a 
personal matter (protective) and those that attempt to impose one’s identity on 
others or the government, or dictate how the law relates to non-identifying in-
dividuals (projective), is one such example. 
Aside from the difficulty in legally defining the notion of religion or reli-
gious identity is the reality that courts are not well positioned to police the 
boundaries of identity.133  This may be particularly true in the realm of religion, 
which unlike race or gender is not often viewed as a legal construction, but may 
instead even be conceived of as a supernatural phenomenon.134  While there 
exists much debate over how to study and understand the phenomenon of reli-
gion,135 it remains inevitable that courts must play some part in deciding how 
to reconcile the role of religion with a secular system of laws. 
  
129. SULLIVAN, supra note 28, at 1 (characterizing “[d]efining religion” and “[d]rawing a line 
around what counts as religion and what does not” as “very difficult”); Ashby D. Boyle, Fear 
and Trembling at the Court: Dimensions of Understanding in the Supreme Court’s Religion 
Jurisprudence, 3 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 55, 70 (1993). 
130. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
131. Id. at 658 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
132. See, e.g., infra notes 171–175 and accompanying text (describing threshold inquiry framed 
around defining burden on religion in common law terms). 
133. See Lucas, Identity as Proxy, supra note 11, at 1659–68; see also Robert A. Segal, The Social 
Sciences and the Truth of Religious Belief, 48 J. AM. ACAD. RELIGION 403, 404 (1980) 
(arguing that it is the role of the social sciences to “assess the truth of religious explanations of 
religious belief,” and of philosophy and the natural sciences to “consider whether the reasons 
believers provide for holding their beliefs are valid reasons for holding them”). 
134. Segal, supra note 133, at 405 (explaining that some attribute their religious beliefs to a 
supernatural cause, such as experiencing God). 
135. See, e.g., Robert Segal, Theories of Religion, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO THE 
STUDY OF RELIGION 75, 77 (John R. Hinnells ed., 2d ed. 2010) (“The key divide in theories 
of religion is between those theories that hail from the social sciences and those that hail from 
religious studies itself.  Social scientific theories deem the origin and function of religion 
nonreligious. . . . By contrast, theories from religious studies deem the origin and function of 
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The fact that courts may not be the entity best suited to delineate the le-
gitimate from the illegitimate within the religious realm has done little to pre-
vent courts from engaging in this analysis, as they are often required to do so in 
entertaining religious freedom claims.  In hearing such claims, the courts also 
play a role in legitimizing certain religions and delegitimizing others.  As Wil-
liam Marshall has argued, “allowing religion to receive special constitutional 
protection directly enlists the judiciary as a vehicle to reinforce religious identi-
ty.”136  In other words, he suggests that those litigating religious freedom issues 
may be as motivated to do so by the opportunity to receive judicial recognition 
of their religious identity as they are by the opportunity to vindicate their legal 
claims.137  Thus, there may be good reason to limit the instances in which the 
court is forced to resolve questions regarding religion or conflicts between the 
religious and the secular. 
B. The Protection of Individual Identity 
Much of the discussion about what the Religion Clauses protect has been 
defined by the belief-action dichotomy.  Whether waged on historical or religious 
grounds, the primary question has been whether and to what extent the Clauses 
protect religious belief or conscience, or whether they were intended only to pro-
tect religious exercise in the more tangible form of physical action.  To the extent 
the Religion Clauses focus on the interaction between the individual and the 
state,138 infringement on both action and belief may be seen as problematic; 
indeed, at various points in time, the Court has concluded as much. 
Early interpretations of religious freedom, as demonstrated by state con-
stitutional provisions drafted in the wake of the American Revolution, “de-
fined the scope of the free exercise right in terms of the conscience of the individual 
believer and the actions that flow from that conscience.”139  While religious opin-
ion, expression of opinion, and religious practices were expressly protected, exer-
cise was understood to refer to “action.”140  Michael McConnell has explained 
that an initial draft of the federal constitutional provision protecting religious 
  
religion distinctively religious: the need that religion arises to fulfill is for the experience of 
God.”).  
136. Marshall, supra note 9, at 402. 
137. Id. (“Religion clause litigation often appears more to be an attempt to receive judicial 
imprimatur than it is an effort to redress actual harms.”). 
138. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Understanding of the Free Exercise of Religion, 
103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1416–20 (1990).  
139. Id. at 1458–59. 
140. Id. at 1459. 
Free Exercise of Religious Identity 83 
 
 
freedom referred to “rights of conscience” rather than the “free exercise of reli-
gion.”141  McConnell makes three important observations as to preference for 
the free exercise of religion construction over the rights of conscience lan-
guage.  First, he suggests that the choice to include “free exercise of religion” in 
lieu of the earlier considered “rights of conscience” suggests a leaning toward 
action rather than belief.142  Second, he argues that “conscience” emphasizes 
individual judgment—perhaps based in or integral to identity—while “reli-
gion” is more likely to implicate organizational or institutional aspects of religious 
belief.143  Last, a reference to “rights of conscience” could arguably extend to pro-
tect belief systems based in something other than religion—for example, econom-
ic theory, political ideology, or secular moral philosophy.144 
One of the earliest cases to attempt a definition of religious exercise was Reyn-
olds v. United States,145 decided by the Supreme Court in 1878.  At issue in Reynolds 
was whether members of the Mormon Church could be exempted from laws for-
bidding polygamy as a matter of free exercise.146  In that case, the Court drew a 
sharp line between action, over which the legislature could exercise control, 
and opinion (or belief), over which it could not.147  The freedom of belief has 
often been understood to mean that individuals cannot be compelled to accept 
a particular religious creed or form of worship.148  Indeed, this would constitute 
an attempt to displace religious identity within the individual sphere, which 
would be problematic under current doctrine and under the framework pro-
posed herein. 
More recently, the Court has extended protection to religious action, 
perhaps in part because certain actions inform and help to define religious 
  
141. Id. at 1488. 
142. Id. at 1489 (noting that the dictionary at the time defined “exercise” to mean use, application, 
or practice, while “conscience” was more likely understood as referring to opinion or belief). 
143. Id. at 1490. 
144. Id. at 1491.  Supreme Court jurisprudence has reinforced this distinction.  For example, in 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court held that “[a] way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may 
not be imposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation . . . if it is based on purely secular 
considerations; to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in 
religious belief.”  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). 
145. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
146. Id. at 166. 
147. In Reynolds, the Court upheld the government’s ability to criminalize polygamy, holding that 
“[l]aws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere 
religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.” Id.  
148. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961) (“Compulsion by law of the acceptance of 
any creed or the practice of any form of worship is strictly forbidden.”). 
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identity.149  For example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the State of Wisconsin “con-
cede[d] that under the Religion Clauses religious beliefs are absolutely free 
from the State’s control, but it argue[d] that ‘actions,’ even though religiously 
grounded, are outside the protection of the First Amendment.”150  The Court 
rejected this view, explaining that while states have the authority in some instances 
to regulate religious conduct to promote health, safety, or the general welfare, 
there are some other examples of religious conduct—such as forgoing work to ob-
serve the Sabbath151—that are beyond state control.152 
The notion that the Constitution protects the individual’s ability to de-
fine his or her own identity is not a novel one, nor is it unique to the religion 
context.  In the context of race-based school assignment programs, Justice 
Kennedy wrote in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dis-
trict No. 1:153 “Under our Constitution the individual, child or adult, can find 
his own identity, can define her own persona, without state intervention that 
classifies on the basis of his race or the color of her skin.”154  More recently, in 
his opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges,155 Justice Kennedy emphasized liberty’s 
protection of “certain personal choices central to individual dignity and auton-
omy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”156  
Although rooted in due process, the Court has emphasized this point in the 
context of the First Amendment as well, holding in Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees157 that the Constitution protects “the ability independently to define 
one’s identity that is central to any concept of liberty.”158 
One way to conceptualize the relationship between religion and identity 
in the context of the law is that law’s impact on religion can and should affect 
only the individual’s relationship to others in society, not the relationship be-
tween the individual and her religion.  This is consistent with the Court’s under-
standing that an individual must be able to define her own religious identity.  To 
the extent that they are critical to achieving or maintaining that identity within 
  
149. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (“[T]he ‘exercise of 
religion’ often involves not only belief and profession but the performance of (or abstention 
from) physical acts.”). 
150. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219 (1972). 
151. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403–04 (1963). 
152. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220. 
153. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
154. Id. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
155. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
156. Id. at 2597. 
157. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
158. Id. at 619. 
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the internal sphere, beliefs and actions should be protected as well.159  Yet this 
protection cannot be unbounded, and the fact that it has limits does nothing to 
disparage religious identity; it is merely the result of an inevitable conflict be-
tween the role of law and the realities of a religiously pluralistic society.  As 
Michael McConnell has recognized, “A religious duty does not cease to be a 
religious duty merely because the legislature has passed a generally applicable 
law making compliance difficult or impossible.”160  One way of policing these 
boundaries is to ensure that law protects religious identity within the internal 
sphere, and thus creates accommodations to prevent encroachment on that 
realm, but stops short of allowing religious identity to dictate how the law 
should operate with regard to the rights of others.161 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Obergefell—setting forth a holding that 
clashes with certain religious beliefs—acknowledged and addressed the ten-
sion between religious identity and the law.  Writing for the Court, Justice 
Kennedy addressed the role of religion in the wake of the ruling, which held 
that bans on same-sex marriage were unconstitutional.  He emphasized that 
the ability to pursue and express those religious beliefs must be protected,162 
and that the opinion was in no way intended to disparage such beliefs.163  Yet, 
he also suggested that when such “sincere, personal opposition becomes enacted 
law and public policy,” it has transgressed its proper boundaries and impermissibly 
requires the state to privilege such beliefs over other legal principles, including the 
protection of liberty.164  Some, including the dissenters in Obergefell, perceived 
the majority’s opinion as diminishing the religious freedom rights protected by 
  
159. See infra Part III.A (describing cases supporting this view in more detail). 
160. McConnell, supra note 138, at 1512. 
161. I have made this same argument in the context of multiracial identity and equal protection.  
See Lucas, Undoing Race?, supra note 11, at 1249.  In that article, I argue that while the law 
should attempt when possible to accommodate multiracial individuals’ desire to define their 
own unique racial identity, the ways in which multiracial individuals conceive of racial identity 
should not ultimately drive the law’s use of racial categories in attempting to achieve racial 
equality. 
162. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015) (“[I]t must be emphasized that religions, 
and those who adhere to religious doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere 
conviction that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned.  The First 
Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are given proper protection as 
they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths, 
and to their own deep aspirations to continue the family structure they have long revered.”). 
163. Id. at 2602 (“Many who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach that conclusion based on 
decent and honorable religious or philosophical premises, and neither they nor their beliefs 
are disparaged here.”). 
164. Id. (“But when that sincere, personal opposition becomes enacted law and public policy, the 
necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that soon 
demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then denied.”). 
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the First Amendment, particularly in comparison to other legal rights such as 
those protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.165  
One must at the very least acknowledge, however, that unlimited protection of 
both religious and substantive due process rights in this context would result in 
irreconcilable conflict.  This Article proposes one means of reconciling these 
two sets of rights, which is to limit the protection of each to a specific realm.  
This would require the law to bend or accommodate as necessary when reli-
gion is exercised within the personal sphere, but fail to offer special protection 
to religious exercise when it purports not only to determine the path of the indi-
vidual or religious community, but also to dictate how others in society (includ-
ing those outside of the religious community) should relate to one another. 
Looking beyond the United States to international law can provide a 
unique conception of the rights one might view as both included in and ex-
cluded from the First Amendment right to free exercise.  The Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights of 1948 (UDHR) is one law that provides such 
insight.  Article 18 of the UDHR articulates a right “to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion.”166  This right consists of two components.  The first 
protects the individual’s “freedom to change his religion or belief,” and the sec-
ond protects “freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public 
or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and 
observance.”167  As described by Russell Sandberg, the first right is internal, re-
lates to thought and conscience, and protects “the right to hold a religion or be-
lief and to change it.”168  In contrast, the second right is external and protects 
one’s right to “manifest religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice, and ob-
servance.”169  Both of these rights—the inward-focused right to associate and 
  
165. Id. at 2625 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision, for example, creates serious 
questions about religious liberty.  Many good and decent people oppose same-sex marriage as 
a tenet of faith, and their freedom to exercise religion is—unlike the right imagined by the 
majority—actually spelled out in the Constitution.  Respect for sincere religious conviction 
has led voters and legislators in every State that has adopted same-sex marriage 
democratically to include accommodations for religious practice.  The majority’s decision 
imposing same-sex marriage cannot, of course, create any such accommodations.  The 
majority graciously suggests that religious believers may continue to ‘advocate’ and ‘teach’ 
their views of marriage.  The First Amendment guarantees, however, the freedom to ‘exercise’ 
religion.  Ominously, that is not a word the majority uses.” (first citing U.S. CONST. amend. 
I; and then citing Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607 (majority opinion)). 
166. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at 74 (Dec. 10, 1948); see 
Russell Sandberg, Religion and the Individual: A Socio-Legal Perspective, in RELIGION AND 
THE INDIVIDUAL: BELIEF, PRACTICE, IDENTITY 158, 159 (Abby Day ed., 2008). 
167. G.A. Res. 217, supra note 166, at 74. 
168. Sandberg, supra note 166, at 159. 
169. Id. 
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identify with the religion of one’s choice, and the sometimes outward-facing 
right to engage in meaningful practice and observance of that religion—are 
and should be protected under the First Amendment.  Yet excluded from the 
UDHR’s definition and from the approach advocated herein is the right to 
have one’s identity legitimized or imposed on others through legal adoption or 
promotion.  Indeed, the law’s choice to promote one identity over others 
would counteract the Free Exercise Clause’s indirect protection of religious 
pluralism.170  It arguably runs afoul of the Establishment Clause as well.171 
Although the Court has not addressed explicitly the notion of religion as 
identity, it has been hesitant to define what religion means to the individual 
and has emphasized in other contexts that the individual should be free to not 
only define, but also pursue, her own identity.  Even so, as described in Part 
III, the Court has recognized that protection of identity cannot be limitless; 
many of the cases in which the Court has drawn limits around the exercise of 
religious identity track the protective-projective distinction advocated in this 
Article. 
III. THE EXERCISE OF RELIGIOUS IDENTITY 
As suggested in Part II, there must be some limit imposed on the reach of 
religious freedom (or religious identity) claims and, over time, the courts have 
made various attempts to impose distinctions between claims that will receive 
such protection and those that will fall outside of it.  Ira Lupu has observed, for 
example, that the belief-action dichotomy once so central to free exercise juris-
prudence has fallen away, giving rise instead to a framework focused on the ex-
tent to which government action burdens free exercise.172  Less explored, Lupu 
noted, has been the character of government activity necessary to constitute a 
  
170. Gedicks, supra note 20, at 775 (“It is no longer possible to accommodate conservative 
religious beliefs and practices—or, indeed, any religious beliefs and practices—in public life.  
In a social welfare society marked by radical religious pluralism, exempting believers from 
generally applicable laws enacted for the good of society inevitably imposes costs on others 
who believe and practice differently.”); McConnell, supra note 138, at 1516 (describing 
religious pluralism as an “organizing principle of church-state relations”); see also John D. 
Inazu, A Confident Pluralism, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 587, 592 (2015) (describing “confident 
pluralism” as “rooted in the conviction that protecting the integrity of one’s own beliefs and 
normative commitments does not depend on coercively silencing opposing views”). 
171. One might think of the Establishment Clause as prohibiting the state from facilitating the 
explicit promotion of one religious identity—including by allowing individuals of one rel-
gious identity to impose their beliefs on others.  See infra notes 260–269 and accompanying 
text.   
172. Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 933, 939 (1989). 
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burden.173  To the extent that a meaningful limit could be placed on what con-
stitutes a burden, Lupu argued that the ability to apply “a restrictive doctrine at 
the threshold of claims” would diminish the need for “inquiries into sincerity, 
religiosity, and state interest frequently demanded by current free exercise 
norms.”174  Like Lupu’s attempt to flesh out the meaning of what might con-
stitute a burden on free exercise by drawing on common law principles,175 this 
Article advocates for a threshold inquiry that would provide a mechanism for 
dismissing some claims “without seeming unreasonable or unsympathetic to 
values of religious liberty.”176  That inquiry focuses not on the character of the 
burden posed, but on the manner in which religious identity is being exercised.  
This Article ultimately argues that protective claims of religious identity 
should be deemed cognizable under the Free Exercise Clause, while projective 
claims of religious identity should fall outside of First Amendment protection. 
Through an exploration of older and more recent free exercise claims, this 
Part attempts to demonstrate the delineation between protective and projec-
tive claims of religious identity.  Protective claims of religious identity are 
those that attempt to protect and preserve religious identity within the person-
al sphere or as directed inward.  Thus, individuals or groups raising such claims 
may seek necessary accommodations from generally applicable laws to ensure 
they can still act in accordance with their religious identity.  In contrast, projec-
tive claims of religious identity are directed outward, focused on operation of the 
law as it relates to others.  In such instances, the religious objector is attempting 
to impose her religious identity on others or to conform the law to her own sense 
of religious identity. 
While this Article refers often to the exercise of identity within the indi-
vidual sphere, the protective-projective distinction described herein applies 
just as readily in the context of group-based religious identity.  Without delv-
ing into the broader question whether the Constitution protects group 
rights,177 this Article acknowledges not only that groups serve as an important 
  
173. Id. at 934.  On one extreme would be the possibility that only criminal prohibitions of 
religious activity or government coercion leading to the violation of religious norms fall 
within the Clause’s purview; on the other would be the possibility that any government action 
that “increases the expense, discomfort, or difficulty of religious life” could constitute an 
impermissible burden.  Id. at 935. 
174. Id. at 948. 
175. Id. at 966 (proposing that “[w]henever religious activity is met by intentional government 
action analogous to that which, if committed by a private party, would be actionable under 
general principles of law, a legally cognizable burden on religion is present”). 
176. Id. at 948. 
177. For a more thorough discussion on this point, see Ronald R. Garet, Communality and 
Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001, 1002–03 (1983) (suggesting that 
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source of individual identity,178 but also that a religious group may form its own 
distinct religious identity, which could provide a basis for a protective claim as 
described in Part III.A.179 
Two caveats before proceeding: First, this Article does not claim that the 
protective-projective framework can be reconciled with all existing case law, 
nor is it intended to explain the outcome of every case.  The below Subparts 
merely serve to highlight aspects of existing cases that align with the framework 
and to demonstrate how that framework might apply to more recent cases.  Sec-
ond, the protective-projective framework is not intended to be wholly disposi-
tive, but rather to function as an initial part of a multistep inquiry.  Even if the 
nature of the claim at issue is protective, it may still be that an important or 
compelling government interest justifies the suppression of religious exer-
cise.180  The distinction offers a means for siphoning off one group of claims as 
non-cognizable early on in the analysis, leaving for another day the difficult 
question of how to determine whether the remaining claims will ultimately be 
meritorious. 
A. Protective Claims of Religious Identity 
Protective claims are those that aim to preserve individuals’ or groups’ ability 
to define and pursue their religious identity within the confines of their own sphere.  
There are several examples throughout the Court’s jurisprudence of claims 
that would be properly characterized as protective; while not all successful, 
  
although the Constitution does not provide explicit textual support for group rights, certain 
constitutional provisions can be read to presume their existence). 
178. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Recurring Paradox of Groups in the Liberal State, 2010 UTAH 
L. REV. 47, 54 (suggesting that “groups constitute individual identity”). 
179. See infra notes 208–214 and accompanying text (discussing a group-based protective claim in 
Hosanna-Tabor).  The constitutional right to freedom of association might also be perceived 
to support the notion that groups can form meaningful identities.  See Garet, supra note 177, 
at 1006 (suggesting that groups have speech and association rights based on the First 
Amendment).  Decided outside of the religion context, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 
U.S. 640 (2000), is instructive as to the larger question of group identity.  In Boy Scouts, the 
Court recognized the organization’s right to protect its own group identity by refusing to 
accept members who engaged in homosexual conduct.  Id. at 644.  In so holding, the Court 
emphasized that forcing the Boy Scouts to accept a member such as James Dale, a gay rights 
activist and the co-president of a gay and lesbian organization while in college, would 
fundamentally transform the group’s identity from one that deemed homosexual conduct as 
immoral to one that condoned such activity.  Id. at 653.  The Court distinguished Boy Scouts 
from Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), finding that enforcement of the 
statutes under discussion in Roberts would not have had the same effect on the organization’s 
identity.  Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 657–58. 
180. This Article does not take a position as to the level of scrutiny (for example, strict or 
intermediate scrutiny) that should be applied to such a claim. 
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they would overcome the threshold distinction—intended not as dispositive, 
but only as a screening mechanism—advocated in this Article. 
One type of religious freedom claim often raised involves actors seeking 
to engage in religious behavior that, as a general matter, is illegal.  One such 
example was the claim made by Alfred Smith in Employment Division, De-
partment of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.181  At issue in Smith was 
whether prohibition of the sacramental use of peyote in Native American reli-
gious rituals violated the Free Exercise Clause.182  In Smith, Justice Scalia de-
scribed the “exercise of religion” as encompassing “not only belief and 
profession but the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts,” such as 
assembling with others to worship or imbibing sacramental wine.183  While the 
religiosity of the act in question—the use of peyote—was not questioned, 
trouble arose because those seeking to engage in such religious activity were vi-
olating Oregon law that did not target religious practices, but instead placed a 
general ban on the possession of controlled substances.184  Ultimately, the 
Smith Court rejected Smith’s claim, holding that the First Amendment did 
not necessarily “bar[] application of a neutral, generally applicable law to reli-
giously motivated action.”185 
Although unsuccessful in this case, Smith might be viewed as having 
properly raised a protective claim of religious identity: His goal was to engage 
in a ritual that was an important part of his religious identity as a member of 
the Native American Church.186  Thus, he was attempting to seek an exemp-
tion from the law criminalizing such behavior in order to preserve his religious 
identity (as exercised in the context of his own ability to engage in the peyote-
based ritual).  Based on identity considerations alone—which, in the Smith 
case, might be outweighed by the law’s more general need to police drug-
related behavior187—Smith would have a viable claim, as he was attempting to 
  
181. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
182. Id. at 874.  Smith had been dismissed from his job as a result of using peyote and 
subsequently denied unemployment compensation since his discharge was due to illegal drug 
use.  Id. 
183. Id. at 877. 
184. Id. at 874 (“Oregon law prohibits the knowing or intentional possession of a ‘controlled 
substance’ unless the substance has been prescribed by a medical practitioner.” (citations 
omitted)). 
185. Id. at 881.  In so holding, the Court distinguished other cases in which it had invalidated laws 
of a similar nature, contending that in those cases other constitutional protections—such as 
freedom of speech and the press—were implicated.  Id. 
186. Id. at 874. 
187. An inquiry about whether that claim should outweigh the need for a consistently applied 
regulatory scheme would still ensue and Smith’s claim would likely fail. 
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engage in a religious practice within a personal sphere of activity.  Such protec-
tions would not extend, however, to a projective claim by Smith regarding oth-
ers’ use of peyote, or a more general claim about the statute’s constitutionality 
aside from its application to his personal request for an exemption. 
Wisconsin v. Yoder exemplifies another type of protective free exercise 
claim.188  At issue in Yoder was whether the Amish could be compelled by state 
law to attend either private or public school until the age of sixteen.189  By find-
ing that a requirement of compulsory formal education would violate the re-
spondents’ right to free exercise of religion, the Court allowed the respondents 
to foster their religious identity within the confines of their own community.  
Chief Justice Burger’s observation in Yoder that ordered liberty does not allow 
for “every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which 
society as a whole has important interests”190 can be viewed as supporting a 
protective-projective distinction.  While society has an interest in how indi-
viduals relate to one another and how the state manages individual behavior 
more broadly, it arguably has less of an interest in how one family or group of 
families chooses to educate their own children in accordance with their reli-
gious faith.191  In other words, individuals should have leeway to make stand-
ards regarding conduct within the individual sphere, but such standards should 
not be endorsed or promoted as governing others’ conduct.  This is particularly 
so when society has valid reasons for constructing the law (and thus relationships 
between individuals and the state) in a particular way.192  Thus, a better analog 
to current projective identity claims would involve a situation in which those of 
Amish faith had attempted to prevent others from attending public or private 
schools, objecting to the compulsory school law not as applied to them, but as a 
  
188. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
189. Id. at 207. 
190. Id. at 215–16. 
191. Erwin Chemerinsky and Michele Goodwin disagree with the Court’s holding in Yoder, 
disputing that “denying education to children under sixteen is harmless.”  Erwin 
Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Religion Is Not a Basis for Harming Others, 104 GEO. L.J. 
1111, 1119 (2016) (reviewing PAUL A. OFFIT, BAD FAITH: WHEN RELIGIOUS BELIEF 
UNDERMINES MODERN MEDICINE (2015)).  They acknowledge, however, that “Yoder is 
based on the Court’s conclusion that exempting these children from the schooling 
requirement was unlikely to harm them.”  Chemerinksy & Goodwin, supra, at 1119.  They 
also point out that, other than the employment benefit cases and Yoder, during this time 
period the Court never found another law to violate the Free Exercise Clause.  Id. at 1122. 
192. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (“The mere 
possession of religious convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a political society 
does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities (footnote omitted).” 
(quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594–95 (1940))). 
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universal matter by claiming that its very existence was contrary to their reli-
gious belief system.193 
Similarly, in Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security 
Division,194 the Court held that the State of Indiana could not deny unem-
ployment benefits to an individual who terminated his employment because it 
interfered with the internal manifestation of his religious identity.195  Eddie 
Thomas was a Jehovah’s Witness who, upon the closing of his division of 
Blaw-Knox Foundry & Machinery Company and subsequent transfer to a 
department that produced turrets for military tanks, claimed “his religious 
beliefs prevented him from participating in the production of war materi-
als.”196  Because all remaining divisions of Blaw-Knox were engaged in the 
production of weapons, Thomas quit, “asserting that he could not work on 
weapons without violating the principles of his religion.”197  The Court held 
that the Review Board’s determination that such circumstances did not consti-
tute good cause for termination of employment under Indiana’s unemploy-
ment compensation statute violated Thomas’s right to free exercise of his 
religion.198  Thomas’s request for accommodation related solely to the personal 
relationship between him and his faith; thus, being forced to choose between 
engaging in employment that would interfere with his internal conception of 
his religious identity and the inability to subsist was deemed unacceptable.199 
Thomas’s claim that his religious belief precluded him from producing 
weapons might be viewed as having a downstream (and possibly projective) effect 
in addition to a protective element.  When he exempts himself from producing 
such weapons, that action inevitably has some effect on those who would use 
the weapons or have a different view about the morality of producing such 
  
193. One might argue that the claim made in Yoder was not merely protective, in that the parents 
were themselves projecting their identity as patriarchs onto their children.  While this may be 
true in some sense, for purposes of the argument made in this Article, I am considering the 
issues only from the perspective of those asserting the claim—here, the parents who refused 
to send their children to public or private school.  For a discussion of whether children should 
be afforded rights of religious exercise, whether they should be able to make religious choices 
that conflict with those of their parents, and how the state should ascertain the religious views 
of children, see generally Emily Buss, What Does Frieda Yoder Believe?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
53 (1999). 
194. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
195. Id. at 720. 
196. Id. at 709. 
197. Id. at 710. 
198. Id. at 712, 719. 
199. Id. at 717 (“[N]ot only is it apparent that appellant’s declared ineligibility for benefits derives 
solely from the practice of her religion, but the pressure upon her to forego that practice is 
unmistakable.” (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963))). 
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weapons.200  For purposes of a projective claim analysis, this Article and the 
framework suggested herein draw a distinction between the incidental or 
downstream costs that an exercise of religious identity may have (permissible), 
and those exercises that focus primarily on how non-identifying individuals re-
late to one another, whether or not that effect is intentional (impermissible).  
So while Thomas’s action may have some effect on the ability of others to en-
gage in the production of weapons or warfare if multiplied across many em-
ployees, the belief or aspect of identity on which he is acting does not 
encompass any notion of how other individuals must necessarily relate to each 
other or preclude other individuals from engaging in weapons production.  In 
that sense, it functions as a true accommodation of the individual, and not as a 
means to displace law.201 
Another way of thinking about Thomas’s claim is that his belief itself 
might be perceived as both protective and projective.  Thomas likely believes 
not only that he should not engage in such production, but also that it is, in 
fact, morally wrong.  The question then becomes how he operationalizes that 
belief and whether he confines it to his own identity or attempts to impose it 
on others.  The accommodation that Thomas sought and ultimately vindicat-
ed in this case allowed him to preserve his own religious identity by exempting 
him from action that would run contrary to that identity.  Yet his exemption 
from the larger scheme—and from employment at the machinery company—
does not impose that belief or understanding on others or conform industry 
standards to his belief system, even though it may be perceived as having an ef-
fect on others through decreased weapon production. 
In Holt v. Hobbs,202 decided in early 2015, the Court held that an Arkan-
sas Department of Corrections policy that prohibited the petitioner from 
growing a half-inch beard in accordance with his Muslim faith violated the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA).203  
  
200. Similarly, his exertion of the right to free exercise and subsequent right to obtain 
unemployment benefits may have some effects on the employer, however small or indirect. 
201. It should be noted that this argument is not intended to preclude the involvement of religious 
identity in the public sphere or of religion’s presence in a political democracy.  For example, 
Thomas could protest weapons manufacturing and lobby the legislature to shut the plant 
down, all the while doing so on explicitly religious terms without running afoul of the 
protective-projective distinction.  If the law itself changes as a result of the political process, 
the need to police the boundaries between identity and law with regard to that issue will 
dissipate. 
202. 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015). 
203. Id. at 867. 
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Setting aside the statutory context for the moment,204 and looking instead at 
the nature of the claim asserted, the prisoner sought to grow a short beard in 
accordance with the dictates of his religious faith and was prohibited from do-
ing so by existing Department policy.205  Decided under the standard set forth 
by RLUIPA, the Court held that the Department’s grooming policy substan-
tially burdened Holt’s exercise of religion and did not further the Department’s 
compelling interest in preventing prisoners from hiding contraband (nor was it 
the least restrictive means of doing so).206  While Holt’s claim dealt with his ex-
ternal appearance, it can still be viewed as protective, because it deals solely 
with his personal manifestation of identity.  In her concurrence, Justice Gins-
burg highlighted this point, and contrasted the instant case with Hobby Lob-
by, noting: “Unlike the exemption this Court approved in Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., accommodating petitioner’s religious belief in this case 
would not detrimentally affect others who do not share petitioner’s belief.”207 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C.208 is 
another case that, conceived of in the group identity context,209 is consistent 
with the notion of protecting identity within a more limited sphere.  At issue 
in the case was a lawsuit brought against a member congregation of the Lu-
theran church by a church schoolteacher who claimed she had been fired in vi-
olation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).210  Invoking the 
“ministerial exception,” which had been recognized uniformly by the Courts of 
Appeals, the church claimed the suit was barred by the First Amendment, 
which protects from legal scrutiny the church’s selection of its own religious 
ministers.211  The Supreme Court upheld the inapplicability of the ADA to the 
church, holding that to conclude otherwise would interfere with the “internal 
governance of the church” and the “religious group’s right to shape its own 
faith and mission through its appointments.”212   
  
204. The U.S. Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 
2000 (RLUIPA), and its sister statute, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 
(RFRA), to provide greater protection for religious liberty than was provided by the Court in 
Smith.  Id. at 859–60. 
205. The Court notes that petitioner believed his faith prohibited him from trimming his beard at 
all, but that the petitioner proposed the shorter beard as a “compromise” with prison 
regulations.  Id. at 861. 
206. Id. at 859. 
207. Id. at 867 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
208. 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
209. See supra notes 177–179 and accompanying text. 
210. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 701. 
211. Id. at 701, 705. 
212. Id. at 706. 
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Distinguishing Hosanna-Tabor from Employment Division v. Smith, the 
Court held that Smith “involved government regulation of only outward physi-
cal acts,” while the employment decision at issue in Hosanna-Tabor “affect[ed] 
the faith and mission of the church itself.”213  This distinction highlighted the 
internal-external delineation suggested in this Article: The church’s decision 
about who would be formally anointed to instruct others in the way of the 
church was viewed as fundamental to its religious identity and critical to the 
formation of that identity, yet the reach of this identity was limited to only 
those decisions affecting matters internal to the entity.214  And while the 
church’s invocation of the ministerial exception did affect the application of 
the ADA to others, the “other” at issue was an identifying individual and the 
church’s action affected the application of the law to her only insofar as she was 
a part of and played an important role in the institution’s own identity.215 
All the cases described above demonstrate qualities of identity claims that 
might be categorized as protective.  While not all of the religious claimants 
were successful, the protective-projective framework would at the very least 
render their claims cognizable—even if it would not be determinative of their 
ultimate constitutionality.216 
  
213. Id. at 707 (emphasis added).  For the reasons described above, and its outward nature 
notwithstanding, the claim in Smith would still be categorized as a protective, rather than 
projective, claim of religious identity. 
214. Similarly, Frederick Mark Gedicks has argued that even when group rights do exist, they may 
be cabined to limit their effects on non-members.  See Gedicks, supra note 178, at 60 
(“[W]hen group autonomy or privacy would impose substantial costs on non-members, state 
regulation or other intervention is generally appropriate.”); id. (“When group rights entail 
significant externalities . . . the state is justified in overriding group autonomy and group 
rights.”).  Federal regulations promulgated in the context of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
mirror this understanding to some degree.  To be exempt from the contraceptive mandate, a 
“religious employer” must have as its purpose the inculcation of religious values, primarily 
employ persons who share the religious tenets of the organization, serve primarily persons 
who share the religious tenets of the organization, and be classified as a nonprofit 
organization.  See 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B) (2013).  Setting aside the last 
requirement, which is unrelated, the first three requirements may be viewed as ensuring that the 
organization can fairly assert a religious identity and therefore the ability to protect that identity 
through the right to free exercise. 
215. Like the Yoder case, see supra note 193, Hosanna-Tabor raises questions about the recourse for 
dissenting members of religious entities in the face of oppressive power dynamics or coercion.  
While I agree that such dynamics are problematic, the framework suggested in this Article is 
intended to function only as a threshold inquiry, not a dispositive one.  It may be that such 
issues can be addressed through other means, if not through the protective-projective 
framework. 
216. For example, a court might conclude (as did the Smith Court) that there is a need to prioritize 
certain legal relationships over the exercise of religious identity.  In doing so, it might be seen 
as giving more weight to rights-based harm than identity-based harm.  The Court explained 
in Smith, citing Yoder as one example, that “[t]he only decisions in which we have held that 
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B. Projective Claims of Religious Identity 
More recent articulations of the free exercise right seem to tread a differ-
ent ground than in the cases described in Part III.A.  Instead of trying to use 
the Free Exercise Clause to carve out a protected space in the individual or per-
sonal sphere for the exercise of religious identity, these claimants argue for the 
protection of identity as exercised beyond that sphere and with regard to the 
rights of others.217  Ultimately, the free exercise of identity in a projective fash-
ion is an oxymoron, or at the very least incoherent; if one accepts the premise 
that identity is a personal phenomenon218—the individual or community’s 
construction of a way of being, or adoption of a system of beliefs and values—
to exercise it in a projective manner or to force it onto others is per se imper-
missible.219 
For example, in the recent case of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,220 
the respondents (Hobby Lobby) described not just a specific belief, but rather 
  
the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously 
motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise 
Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of 
the press . . . .”  Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).  
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), discussed in Part I.B.2, was cited as 
another such example.  Thus, if the only harm of an otherwise reasonable and generally 
applicable law is on religious identity, distinct from the exercise of other rights, an exemption 
may not be justified.  This conclusion does not necessarily follow from the protective-
projective distinction, but it is a further distinction that may be made within the realm of 
protective identity claims. 
217. Frederick Mark Gedicks has suggested, for example, that the controversy over state RFRAs is 
less about whether religious liberty should be protected and more about where it should be 
protected.  Gedicks, supra note 20, at 774.  He suggests that the tension arises from the effort 
to “allow conservative Christian morals—a quintessential ‘private’ concern in contemporary 
liberal theory—to impose themselves on (i) those who do not share them, in (ii) spaces of 
American life such as housing, the for-profit workplace, and retail commercial businesses, 
which have been governed by ‘public’ values.”  Id. 
218. This is not to suggest that the formation of identity is insulated from outside influence; 
indeed, such influence is often critical to identity formation.  See JUDITH BUTLER, GIVING 
AN ACCOUNT OF ONESELF 30 (2005) (suggesting that self-recognition is defined through 
“proximate and living exchanges, in the modes by which we are addressed and asked to take 
up the question of who we are and what our relation to the other ought to be”); PAUL 
RICOEUR, ONESELF AS ANOTHER 3 (1992) (suggesting that the definition of self is 
intimately tied to the definition of otherness).  Ultimately, however, the very definition of 
identity is the qualities, beliefs, and expressions that make a person or group different from 
others; to allow the identity of some to trample the identities of others through its adoption 
into law thus presents a threat to identity’s integrity. 
219. See Laycock, supra note 12, at 200 (“Religious dissenters can live their own values, but not if 
they occupy choke points that empower them to prevent same-sex couples from living their 
own values.”). 
220. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
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a set of beliefs and values that guide the company’s business decisions.  In es-
sence, the brief described an identity—albeit a corporate identity.  In its brief 
filed in the Supreme Court, the corporation and its founders described a cor-
porate identity steeped in religious values.221  As a result, they engage in certain 
corporate behaviors—for example, closing all of their businesses on Sundays, 
refusing to sell liquor or other products (such as shot glasses) that may promote 
alcohol use, and providing cost-free access to religious counseling.222  The 
owners also refused to provide health insurance to its employees that would 
cover drugs used to terminate a pregnancy or drugs and devices designed to 
prevent implantation of the embryo in the womb, which gave rise to the Hobby 
Lobby litigation.223  The brief describes the decision to exclude such products 
from the company’s health plan as “exercis[ing] their faith.”224  
In Hobby Lobby, the Court ultimately held that the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA) allowed Hobby Lobby, a closely held corporation, to 
deny its employees health coverage of contraception to which the employees 
would otherwise be entitled based on the religious objections of the company’s 
owners.225  Erwin Chemerinsky and Michele Goodwin have observed that 
“Hobby Lobby was the first time in American history that the Supreme Court 
found a substantial burden on free exercise of religion where a person is merely 
required to take action that might enable other people to do things that are at 
odds with the person’s religious beliefs.”226 
The activities described in the Hobby Lobby owners’ brief are not reli-
gious in nature; nor did the owners assert an inability to associate with or fol-
low the Christian faith.  Instead, their complaint seemed to be that the 
Affordable Care Act’s (ACA’s) contraceptive-coverage mandate prevented 
them from expressing their corporate religious identity through their business 
practices.  One might then think of the right being articulated by Hobby Lob-
by as the right to project religious identity: that is, to bring the application of 
the law into line with one’s conception of the world and the values that accom-
pany it, even if that exercise of identity comes at the expense of others’ ability to 
  
221. Brief for Respondents, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 
13-354), 2014 WL 546899, at *8–9 (explaining that the owners “organized their businesses 
with express religious principles in mind”). 
222. Id. at 8–9. 
223. Id. at 9. 
224. Id. at 31. 
225. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014). 
226. Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 191, at 1133.  They also note that, “[m]ost 
importantly, Hobby Lobby was the first time in American history that the Supreme Court held 
that people, based on their religious practices, can inflict harm on others.”  Id. at 1134. 
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exercise their legal rights.227  Yet as the Court has emphasized throughout its 
earlier cases, while individuals exercising religious identity should be afforded 
some protection from government action, they should not have the authority 
to dictate government policy or to control how these policies apply to others.228  
As Justice Kennedy wrote in his concurrence in Hobby Lobby, the accommoda-
tion of religious liberty may not “unduly restrict other persons, such as employ-
ees, in protecting their own interests.”229 
Two obvious distinctions regarding Hobby Lobby must be addressed here: 
1) the novel question whether a privately-held corporation can assume a reli-
gious identity; and 2) the assertion of religious identity not in the context of the 
First Amendment, but under statutory law such as RFRA (in conjunction with 
RLUIPA’s definition of “exercise of religion” as “any exercise of religion, 
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief”).  As to 
the first point (and viewed through the lens of religious identity), the two cor-
porations at issue—Conestega Wood and Hobby Lobby—were admittedly 
not religious organizations, but businesses formed “in accordance with [the] 
religious beliefs and moral principles”230 of their founding members and in-
tended to be run “in a manner consistent with Biblical principles.”231  Thus, the 
conduct of the businesses was at least one degree removed from concerns di-
rectly implicating identity: a restriction imposed on business conduct is not a 
harm to identity, but rather an obstacle to the owners’ aim to run their business 
in accordance with their religious identity.  In essence, then, the claim by the 
Conestega Wood and Hobby Lobby owners might be viewed as a direct re-
quest that the Court protect this specific instance of projective identity; such a 
  
227. The Hobby Lobby owners’ claim is distinguishable from the claim made by Alfred Smith in 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith.  See supra Part II.A.  The 
analysis in Smith is inapposite to the discussion here, which focuses not on the interaction 
between the state and the individual engaging in religious exercise, but instead on the nature 
of the exercise itself.  This Article does not aim to propose an alternative framework to that 
posed by Smith, or any of the cases that follow in the same vein, but instead suggests a 
preliminary inquiry into whether the claim being made is a protective or projective claim of 
religious identity.  A claim that falls into the protective category would potentially fall within 
the protection of the First Amendment—in which case courts may still require balancing 
against government interests.  In contrast, those in the projective category would, by 
definition, fall outside the realm of constitutional protection and would not require further 
discussion. 
228. See cases discussed later in this Part—for example, the Court’s decision in Roy, which refused 
to allow a religious objection to the use of Social Security numbers to affect the government’s 
ability to use those numbers in administering Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) or food stamps. 
229. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
230. Id. at 2764. 
231. Id. at 2766. 
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claim would clearly be non-cognizable under the framework suggested in this 
Article.  It is also distinct from claims like that made by the Lutheran church in 
Hosanna-Tabor, which aimed to preserve the integrity of the institution’s reli-
gious identity.232  The distinction between these two cases is less about the cat-
egorization of the two entities as church and corporation, given the Court’s 
recognition in Hobby Lobby that corporations can assume a religious identi-
ty.233  Instead, it refers to the fact that the church in Hosanna-Tabor was using 
identity to exercise control over its internal composition and those responsible 
for shaping institutional identity by instructing others about the church’s core 
mission234—a protective use of religious identity.  In contrast, the Hobby Lobby 
owners’ use of religious identity was projective—attempting to impose the 
corporation’s religious beliefs on others and control employees’ personal access 
to contraceptives, which has no direct bearing on the religious identity of the 
corporation. 
As to the fact that the owners in Hobby Lobby asserted claims based on 
RFRA as well as the First Amendment, and given RFRA’s more general ar-
guments about the proper relationship between identity and the law, this Article 
would apply the same framework to RFRA as it would the First Amendment.  
Viewed through the identity lens, the very premise of RFRAs, both state and 
federal, appears to be that the protection of religious identity necessarily and 
explicitly requires the subordination of secular law.  Another way of thinking 
of them, in certain cases, might be as statutory accommodation of projective 
identity claims.235  To the extent that RFRAs allow religious identity to act as a 
  
232. While such a claim may seem similar in nature, for example, to the claim made by the Boy 
Scouts in Boy Scouts v. Dale, the claim in that case was ultimately based on the First 
Amendment right to expressive association; the owners of Conestoga Wood and Hobby 
Lobby made no such parallel claim (such as that there is a right to corporate association). 
233. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Religious Exemptions and the Limited Relevance of Corporate 
Identity, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 376, 392 (Micah 
Schwartzman et al. eds., 2016) (noting that after Hobby Lobby “corporate entities, including 
businesses, have the legal right to adopt and manifest a religious identity”). 
234. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity 
Comm’n, 132 U.S. 694, 707–08 (2012) (explaining that the terminated employee at issue was 
elected by the congregation to fulfill core religious functions of the Church and that her “job 
duties reflected a role in conveying the Church’s message and carrying out its mission”). 
235. Consider, for example, Indiana’s RFRA, which allowed for-profit businesses to assert free 
exercise rights (in the same way as individuals or churches might).  Also, consider the more 
general notion that an individual whose exercise of religion is substantially burdened may 
assert that violation (or impending violation) as a defense in court.  One can certainly imagine 
projective exercises of identity—perhaps all of them—that would be substantially burdened 
by existing law governing the same substantive area. 
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“veto” of secular law,236 rather than merely allowing individuals to avoid an ob-
ligation, they are inherently flawed. 
Another case that provides a useful point for analysis and contrast of pro-
tective and projective claims is United States v. Lee.237  In Lee, an Amish em-
ployer sought an exemption for himself and his employees from the collection 
and payment of Social Security taxes on the grounds that his religious faith 
prohibited participation in governmental support programs.238  Both the court 
below and the Supreme Court accepted the plaintiff’s contention that such be-
havior was prohibited by his religion.239  The Court was unwilling, however, to 
provide any exemption beyond that which Congress had already granted to the 
self-employed.  In explaining its decision, the Court wrote: 
When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as 
a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a 
matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the 
statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity.  
Granting an exemption from social security taxes to an employer op-
erates to impose the employer’s religious faith on the employees.240 
The Court’s reasoning in Lee—and the distinction drawn between the 
self-employed Amish and those of Amish faith who employ others—is reflec-
tive of and aligns with the arguments made in this Article.  In essence, the 
Court suggests that those seeking an exemption in Lee—those who have ac-
cepted certain limits “on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and 
faith,”241 or who have achieved a specific religious identity242—cannot act to as-
sert that identity beyond the individual realm.  Had the employer been self-
employed, the claim could be articulated more simply: The government is 
compelling the individual to engage in behavior that directly contradicts his 
  
236. See Ira Lupu & Robert Tuttle, Symposium: Religious Opt-Outs or Religious Vetoes?, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 15, 2015, 9:33 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/12/ 
symposium-religious-opt-outs-or-religious-vetoes [https://perma.cc/6BAA-YM64] (arguing 
in the context of Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016), that assertions of religious freedom 
should never “be allowed to function as a religiously motivated veto of a policy designed to 
protect others”); id. (“No proper conception of religious freedom can justify [such a great] 
degree of interference with democratically determined measures for advancing the public 
welfare.”). 
237. 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
238. Id. at 254–55. 
239. Id. at 255, 257 (“We therefore accept appellee’s contention that both payment and receipt of 
social security benefits is forbidden by the Amish faith.”). 
240. Id. at 261. 
241. Id.  
242. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (describing achieved religious identity as “the result 
of conscious choices made over the course of one’s life”). 
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religious faith.  Unlike the self-employed individual who refuses to participate 
in the social security system, however, in this instance the employer’s assertion 
of religious identity is “impose[d]” on his employees.243 
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,244 decided in the context of the Establish-
ment Clause, provides another demonstration of the Court’s willingness to 
provide protection for protective claims of religious identity, while withhold-
ing such protection from claims that project individual identity onto others or 
require the public sphere to conform to individualized notions of identity.  At 
issue in Thornton was a Connecticut statute that provided: “No person who 
states that a particular day of the week is observed as his Sabbath may be re-
quired by his employer to work on such day.  An employee’s refusal to work on 
his Sabbath shall not constitute grounds for his dismissal.”245  The Court held 
the statute unconstitutional, drawing a distinction between the accommoda-
tion of identity in the individual case and a law that “imposes on employers and 
employees an absolute duty to conform their business practices to the particu-
lar religious practices of the employee by enforcing observance of the Sabbath 
the employee unilaterally designates.”246   
Aside from the fact that the Connecticut statute “impermissibly ad-
vance[d] a particular religious practice”247—hence the violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause—it was also offensive in that it allowed the individual and his 
or her definition of religious identity to dictate others’ actions (here, the em-
ployer’s ability to dismiss those who cannot adhere to specific working condi-
tions, including working on Saturday or Sunday).248  While the pursuit of 
  
243. Lee, 455 U.S. at 261. 
244. 472 U.S. 703 (1985). 
245. Id. at 706 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53–303e(b) (1985)). 
246. Id. at 709. 
247. Id. at 710.  Also problematic was the fact that the Connecticut statute required the state to 
“decide which religious activities may be characterized as an ‘observance of Sabbath’ in order 
to assess employees’ sincerity.”  Id. at 708. 
248. One might be inclined to see the Connecticut statute as protective in attempting to carve out, 
as a general rule, accommodation for individual observers of the Sabbath.  The problem with 
the statute, in the Court’s view, was its absolutist imposition of one particular 
accommodation across the board, without regard for the employer’s interests or whether 
another type of accommodation might better suit those interests: 
The State thus commands that Sabbath religious concerns automatically 
control over all secular interests at the workplace; the statute takes no account 
of the convenience or interests of the employer or those of other employees 
who do not observe a Sabbath.  The employer and others must adjust their af-
fairs to the command of the State whenever the statute is invoked by an em-
ployee. 
There is no exception under the statute for special circumstances, such as 
the Friday Sabbath observer employed in an occupation with a Monday 
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religious identity is deserving of protection under the Religion Clauses, the 
Court emphasized that “[t]he First Amendment . . . gives no one the right to 
insist that in pursuit of their own interests others must conform their conduct 
to his own religious necessities.”249 
The Court’s decision in Bowen v. Roy250 also suggests that projective 
claims of religious identity are impermissible insofar as they require others to 
conform to individualized conceptions of identity.  In Bowen, the Court reject-
ed a claim by Native American parents that the government’s insistence on us-
ing their daughter’s social security number for purposes of administering its 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Food Stamp program would 
violate their religious beliefs.251  The Court held that the federal government’s 
use of the child’s social security number did “not itself in any degree impair 
Roy’s ‘freedom to believe, express, and exercise’ his religion.”252  The Court 
went on to explain: “Just as the Government may not insist that appellees en-
gage in any set form of religious observance, so appellees may not demand that 
the Government join in their chosen religious practices by refraining from 
  
through Friday schedule—a school teacher, for example; the statute provides 
for no special consideration if a high percentage of an employer’s work force as-
serts rights to the same Sabbath.  Moreover, there is no exception when honor-
ing the dictates of Sabbath observers would cause the employer substantial 
economic burdens or when the employer’s compliance would require the impo-
sition of significant burdens on other employees required to work in place of 
the Sabbath observers.  Finally, the statute allows for no consideration as to 
whether the employer has made reasonable accommodation proposals. 
Id. at 709–10 (emphasis added).  The last sentence in particular highlights the law’s nature as 
projective—using the law’s incorporation of religious identity to dictate the action of 
employers—and distinguishes it from personalized accommodations that would carve out 
space for the individual to pursue her own identity without altering the legal structure 
governing all businesses. 
249. Id. at 710 (quoting Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953)). 
250. 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
251. Id. at 695–98.  The parents claimed that their religious beliefs required them to keep their 
daughter’s “person and spirit unique” and that the “uniqueness of the Social Security number 
as an identifier, coupled with the other uses of the number over which she has no control” 
would “‘rob the spirit’ of [their] daughter and prevent her from attaining greater spiritual 
power.”  Id. at 696. 
252. Id. at 700–01 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2012)).  In concurrence, Justice Blackmun 
suggested that it might still be possible for the parents to have an “independent religious 
objection to their being forced to cooperate actively with the Government by themselves 
providing their daughter’s social security number.”  Id. at 714 (Blackmun, J., concurring in 
part).  Also concurring, Justice Stevens made a similar observation: “[A]s the Court 
demonstrates, an objection to the Government’s use of a Social Security number, and a 
possible objection to ‘providing’ the number when the Government already has it, pose very 
different constitutional problems.”  Id. at 720 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the result). 
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using a number to identify their daughter.”253  Thus, the case supports the prop-
osition that while the Free Exercise Clause demands accommodation of religious 
identity within some limited sphere, it stops short of requiring others—including 
the government—to conform to that identity. 
In that same vein follows the Court’s opinion in Lyng v. Northwest Indian 
Cemetery Protective Association.254  In Lyng, the Court held that the government 
did not violate the Free Exercise Clause by deciding to harvest timber and con-
struct a road over the objection of certain Indian tribes, who claimed that the 
land at issue was sacred and had used such land for religious purposes.255  Cit-
ing Roy, the Court found that the Clause “simply cannot be understood to re-
quire the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport 
with the religious beliefs of particular citizens.”256  The Court additionally ob-
served that “[t]he Free Exercise Clause affords an individual protection from 
certain forms of governmental compulsion; it does not afford an individual a 
right to dictate the conduct of the Government’s internal procedures.”257  It ex-
pressed its hesitance to provide individual citizens with a “veto over public pro-
grams”258 and distinguished the relief sought in Lyng—prohibition of 
  
253. Id. at 699–700 (“[T]he Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government 
cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can extract from the 
government.” (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (Douglas, J., 
concurring))).  Justice Stevens also noted in concurrence that “the Free Exercise Clause does 
not give an individual the right to dictate the Government’s method of recordkeeping.”  Id. at 
716–17 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result). 
254. 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
255. Id. at 441–42.  Although certainly not intended, I acknowledge that this framework may 
inadvertently disadvantage religions that, by their nature, would be more likely to run afoul of 
the protective-projective distinction, such as those whose beliefs often, or are specifically 
intended to, transcend the individual being.  In other words, some categories of religious 
expression—particularly non-Christian religions outside of the mainstream—may be 
marginalized by the more individualized notion of identity supported by the protective-
projective framework.  That phenomenon might give rise to independent equal protection 
concerns—an area that has been underexplored as it relates to religion.  See Susan Gellman & 
Susan Looper-Friedman, Thou Shalt Use the Equal Protection Clause for Religion Cases (Not 
Just the Establishment Clause), 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 665, 666 (2008) (“Challenges to 
discrimination based on religion are hardly ever brought under the Equal Protection 
Clause.”).  I acknowledge this presents a trade-off that, for some, may make the protective-
projective framework untenable.  I would also suggest, however, that any line drawn to cabin 
religious freedom claims will present problems for some; the question is not whether, but for 
whom.  See text accompanying note 82. 
256. Id. at 448 (citing Roy, 476 U.S. at 699). 
257. Id. (citing Roy, 476 U.S. at 700). 
258. Id. at 452. 
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government activity—from accommodation of religious practices like those 
engaged in by respondents.259 
Although this Article has focused primarily on free exercise, there may be 
spillover effects related to other doctrinal areas.  One example is the longstand-
ing tension that has existed between the Free Exercise Clause and the Estab-
lishment Clause.  Some have argued, for example, that in compelling the state 
to provide unemployment benefits to those who terminate employment for re-
ligious reasons, the Court is facilitating the establishment of religion.260  The 
Court had earlier rejected this argument in Sherbert v. Verner,261 holding that 
the extension of benefits under such circumstances “reflects nothing more than 
the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences, 
and does not represent that involvement of religious with secular institutions 
which it is the object of the Establishment Clause to forestall.”262 
The dilemma is this: If the state refuses to provide benefits to a claimant 
like Eddie Thomas, who objects on religious grounds to participating in the 
production of weapons, it is prohibiting the free exercise of religion; yet in 
providing such benefits, it might also be seen as providing aid to religion in 
violation of the Establishment Clause.263  In his dissent in Thomas v. Review 
  
259. Id. at 454.  For an interesting discussion of how Roy and Lyng contribute to jurisprudence 
and an understanding of “substantial burden” in particular that fundamentally 
misunderstands the nature of Native American religion, see Michael D. McNally, From 
Substantial Burden on Religion to Diminished Spiritual Fulfillment: The San Francisco Peaks 
Case and the Misunderstanding of Native American Religion, 30 J.L. & RELIGION 36, 36–37 
(2015) (describing an en banc Ninth Circuit decision in which the production of artificial 
snow using treating sewage on a sacred mountain did not amount to a “substantial burden” 
for Native American communities alleging violation of RFRA because its sole effect was on 
their “subjective spiritual experience” and thus amounted merely to “diminished spiritual 
fulfillment” (quoting Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1113 (9th Cir. 
2007))).  Because the framework proposed in this Article focuses not on the question of 
burden or the degree of harm imposed but instead on the role played by one’s exercise of 
religion, the distinction between religious freedom and supposed mere spiritual fulfillment is 
less relevant. 
260. Indeed, the lower court in Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Divi-
sion had held that “awarding unemployment compensation benefits to a person who 
terminates employment voluntarily for religious reasons, while denying such benefits to 
persons who terminate for other personal but nonreligious reasons, would violate the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”  450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981).  Ultimately, the 
Thomas Court rejected this argument, citing Sherbert v. Verner, holding that Indiana’s denial 
of unemployment compensation benefits to petitioner, a Jehovah’s Witness who quit his job 
because his religious beliefs forbade participation in production of weapons, violated his First 
Amendment right to free exercise of religion.  Id. at 719–20. 
261. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
262. Id. at 409. 
263. See MICHAEL MCCONNELL, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 121 (2011) (“If there 
is a constitutional requirement for accommodation of religious conduct, it will most likely be 
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Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division,264 Chief Justice Rehnquist 
argued that such “tension” was a result of interpreting each Clause too broad-
ly.265  He would have held, in contrast, that when a state has enacted a general 
statute designed to further the state’s secular goals, the Free Exercise Clause 
does not require the state “to conform that statute to the dictates of religious 
conscience of any group.”266 
Viewed through the lens of protective and projective identity claims, the 
state’s decision to provide Thomas with benefits may be easier to reconcile.  
Refusing to provide Thomas benefits would be akin to coercion and would 
impose on his individual ability to define and act in accordance with his own 
religious identity.  By providing benefits, the state makes no statement with 
regard to the religious identity of others; it is merely allowing Thomas to pro-
tect his religious identity as exercised internally.  It is relevant also that in de-
ciding to terminate his employment, Thomas limited the exercise of his 
religious identity to the individual sphere.  Unlike Kim Davis, the court clerk 
who refused to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, he made no attempt to 
conform the workplace to his religious identity or to impose his religious identity 
on others. 
Another means of resolving the supposed tension referenced in Sherbert is 
by recognizing a common theme between the Free Exercise and Establish-
ment Clauses: the notion that neither individuals nor the state can exercise re-
ligion or religious identity by imposing it on others.267  William Marshall has 
argued, for example, that we might understand the Establishment Clause as 
proscribing “[g]overnment action that is perceived as furthering religious 
identity” and “[g]uarding against the state’s being captured as a vehicle to 
promote religious identity.”268  Thus, a prohibition on projective religious 
identity claims would be in alignment with the Establishment Clause, as the 
Clause is opposed to the promotion or projection of one religious identity such 
  
found in the Free Exercise Clause.  Some say, though, that it is a violation of the 
Establishment Clause for the government to give any special benefit or recognition to 
religion.  In that case, we have a First Amendment in conflict with itself—the Establishment 
Clause forbidding what the Free Exercise Clause requires.”).  
264. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
265. Id. at 722. 
266. Id. at 723. 
267. See Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions From the 
Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 343, 356–71 (2014) (emphasizing that religious externalities—the burden on third 
parties—is not just a free exercise problem, but a longstanding concern of the Establishment 
Clause problem as well). 
268. Marshall, supra note 9, at 399. 
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that it infringes on the religious identities of others or obstructs others from 
exercising their legal rights.269 
Under the protective-projective framework described in this Article, the cas-
es discussed in this Part do more than attempt to define or pursue identity in the 
personal sphere.  Instead, they provide examples of imposing identity onto other 
individuals, the government, or existing legal structures.  Thus, these claims would 
not survive the threshold inquiry advocated herein and would be rendered non-
cognizable under the First Amendment. 
C. Application of the Protective-Projective Distinction 
In recent years, the Court has demonstrated a willingness to legitimize 
claims that transgress the protective-projective distinction suggested by the 
Court’s earlier religion jurisprudence.  As Mary Anne Case has observed, 
the Court’s recent cases have “vastly increased the ability of the religious to 
exert control over public governmental space and resources.”270  One re-
sponse to this phenomenon might be to cabin such claims to the personal 
sphere, without casting judgment on the substance of the claim itself.  If claims 
of religious identity attempt to dictate relationships between others or occupy 
the role of law, they should not warrant constitutional protection under the 
First Amendment. 
One such claim was raised in the case of Elane Photography, LLC v. 
Willock,271 decided by the New Mexico Supreme Court in 2013.  In this case, 
Elane Photography refused to photograph a wedding ceremony between 
Vanessa Willock and Misti Collingsworth.272  Willock subsequently filed a 
complaint with the New Mexico Human Rights Commission, claiming that 
the refusal constituted a violation of the New Mexico Human Rights Act 
(NMHRA), which protects against discrimination on the basis of sexual ori-
entation.273  In response Elane Photography argued, among other things, that 
the NMHRA violated its right to freely exercise its religion.274   
  
269. This might appear to some as equivalent to the promotion or projection of secularism, to the 
exclusion of religious identity.  While this Article does not find that categorization 
objectionable, the main intention is not to promote secularism over religious identity, but 
instead to prevent religious identity from overreaching. 
270. Mary Anne Case, Why “Live-and-Let-Live” Is Not a Viable Solution to the Difficult Problems of 
Religious Accommodation in the Age of Sexual Civil Rights, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 463, 475 (2015). 
271. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013). 
272. Id. at 59–60. 
273. Id. at 58–60. 
274. Id. at 60. 
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Elane Photography argued that it had not discriminated against the cou-
ple; instead, the business explained, it ”did not want to convey through [the co-
owner and lead photographer]’s pictures the story of an event celebrating an 
understanding of marriage that conflicts with [the owners’] beliefs.”275  In its 
brief on appeal from the adverse decision of the New Mexico Human Rights 
Commission, the company argued that it had never “refuse[d] to take pho-
tographs of people because of their sexual orientation.”276  The brief then 
went on to describe the owners and photographers’ (the Huguenins) identity 
as Christians and the “strong moral and philosophical beliefs” that accompany 
that identity, including the beliefs that marriage should be defined as between 
a man and a woman and that “marriage defined as one man and woman is the 
best way to benefit, protect and enhance a society, its families and its individual 
members.”277 
What the Huguenins articulated is a definition of self, which by exten-
sion is a definition of their company identity, but also a vision for how the 
world should be—including a vision as to what types of romantic and legal re-
lationships are appropriate.  The brief also explained that due to their “moral, 
philosophical and religious beliefs about the definition of marriage, the owners 
and photographers of Elane Company will not photograph any situation that 
will communicate a view that contradicts or conflicts with the owners’ beliefs 
about the definition of marriage.”278  Thus, the Huguenins wish to conduct 
their business in a manner that does not undermine or challenge their identity. 
The court’s discussion of this argument takes the religious objection at 
face value, and then focuses on the nature of the discrimination and its effect 
on the plaintiffs.  The court characterized the company’s argument as an “an 
attempt to distinguish between an individual’s status of being homosexual and 
his or her conduct in openly committing to a person of the same sex” and hold-
ing that a status-conduct distinction in this context is untenable.279  As to the 
free exercise claim specifically, the court found that the NMHRA was a neu-
tral law of general applicability, and that Elane Photography had not ade-
quately briefed the argument that its free exercise and compelled speech claims 
  
275. Id. at 61. 
276. Appeal From the Decision and Final Order of the New Mexico Human Rights Commission 
at 2, Elane Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) (No. CV-2008-06632). 
277. Id. 
278. Id. at 3. 
279. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 61.  As a result, the court rejected as irrelevant Elane 
Photography’s claim that it would photograph a gay person in a single-person portrait 
because that photograph would not reflect the client’s sexual preferences.  Id. 
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created a “hybrid-rights” situation that might render such a law unconstitu-
tional.280 
Instead of assuming the applicability of the Free Exercise Clause and 
then applying a Smith-type analysis or weighing the company’s rights against 
that of the couple, the court might—under the framework described in this 
Article—have viewed Elane Photography’s refusal as non-cognizable under 
the Free Exercise Clause.  The right to free exercise entitles Elane Photog-
raphy, as well as its owners and employees, to associate and identify with a reli-
gious faith that objects to same-sex weddings and other demonstrations of 
sexual preference.  And it protects their ability to engage as individuals or with 
others of the same faith in customs and practices that are part of that religion.  
Yet what the owners seek in the instant case is something different: The aspect 
of identity for which they seek accommodation relates only to whether and 
how others’ relationships are recognized by the law.  While they have framed 
that belief as an aspect of their personal identity,281 it is ultimately other-
regarding and falls squarely within the realm of what law is intended to govern—
the way in which others may permissibly relate. 
To the extent that such individuals—or the corporation that they have 
created—wish to impose that value structure on others or displace the law in 
that realm, their actions constitute a projective exercise of religious identity 
and should not be protected by the First Amendment.282  This is distinct from 
religious expression, which is a means of conveying one’s own beliefs to oth-
ers.283  The exercise of religious identity exemplified by cases like Elane Photog-
raphy is not merely the conveyance of one’s ideas or values—for example, 
  
280. Id. at 72–76; see also supra note 216 and accompanying text.  The court spends a few lines 
debating whether Elane Company, as a limited-liability corporation, even has free exercise 
rights; finally, it proceeds by explaining that even if it does have such rights, they have not 
been violated here.  Elane Photography, 309 P.3d. at 72–73. 
281. What if it is critical to the formation and pursuit of one’s personal identity that one impose 
that identity on others?  Such a question clearly tests the boundaries of the protective-
projective framework.  For the framework to remain effective, it must necessarily adopt a 
more individualized definition of identity—arguably, a definition in line with the Supreme 
Court’s view of identity, see LUCAS, Undoing Race?, supra note 11, at 1284–85, 1288—that 
would define such a claim as inherently projective and thus non-cognizable. 
282. This is not to suggest that the Huguenins should be forced to take such pictures, only that to 
the extent they wish to engage in the wedding photography business, they will have to 
comply with the law—including its antidiscrimination provisions—and cannot be exempted 
from it on the basis of religion. 
283. Also distinguishable is the case of individuals or groups for whom proselytizing is a critical 
part of their religion and, subsequently, of their religious identity.  Nothing in the framework 
suggested in this Article would prevent those individuals from expressing their faith or 
attempting to convert others.  That is distinct, however, from legally imposing one’s beliefs 
on others or attempting to structure the world in which others operate. 
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perhaps it would be permissible for Elane Photography to hang a poster espousing 
such values in its store—but goes further by obstructing the way in which the law 
relates not just to them, but also to others.284 
To contrast this type of claim with those described as protective in nature, 
one might compare the Huguenins’ claim to Yoder’s claim.  Yoder believed it 
would contradict his religious identity (and, arguably, that of his children—see 
the caveat in note 193) to send his children to public or private school.  The 
Huguenins argue that it would contradict their religious identity to serve 
same-sex couples, given their belief that such relationships are immoral.  
Yoder’s claim does not necessarily imply anything generally about the sound-
ness or appropriateness of a formal education requirement and, more im-
portant, his claim does not dictate how it should apply to others.  In contrast, 
while the Huguenins’ claim is also framed as one based on religious identity, 
the belief or aspect of identity they are purporting to protect focuses specifical-
ly on how others relate to one another.  In that sense, their claim—or use of 
religious identity—is other-regarding rather than internally focused (such as 
concentrating on the way in which one educates oneself or one’s children or 
on the types of relationships one chooses to enter). 
In some ways, it may be difficult to distinguish the Huguenins’ claim 
from Yoder’s: Both parties could be viewed as seeking an opt-out that reflects a 
critique of how other people relate.  In Yoder’s case, for example, the request 
for an exemption may be just as much a critique of compulsory formal educa-
tion as it is a means of protecting the Amish tradition.  And, in both cases, one 
might argue that the only effect on others is indirect, or a result of downstream 
consequences.  While allowing an unlimited number of exemptions would im-
peril access to services, as a practical matter the same-sex couple can simply 
hire another wedding photographer, and the formal education system will still 
  
284. With credit to Jules Epstein, it is interesting to consider the following hypothetical and how 
it would be treated under the protective-projective framework: What if a Muslim witness in a 
criminal trial wears a burqa, which obscures her face and makes it difficult for the judge to 
fully observe her demeanor?  Assuming it is viewed as part of her religious tradition, does her 
personal decision to wear the burqa (and to seek an accommodation toward that end) impose 
on other actors involved in the trial or on the criminal justice system more generally such that 
it should be deemed projective?  This hypothetical is demonstrative of the reality that every 
framework used to limit religious freedom claims will create a gray area and result in hard 
questions.  Rather than try to avoid those questions, which are inevitable regardless of 
approach, we should ensure that the framework chosen results in the right hard questions—in 
other words, those questions that are truly difficult to resolve as a substantive matter and not 
those that are unclear as to result only because of how the inquiry is structured. 
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govern most children without any noticeable impact.285  In that sense, Elane 
Photography does present perhaps the greatest test of the protective-projective 
framework.  The most relevant distinction between the two—and a determi-
native one, in the context of this framework—is the fact that the Huguenins’ 
claim aims to protect belief as it relates to the activity of others.  In doing so, it 
effectively interferes with the application of the law not just to the Huguenins 
themselves (as an exemption or opt-out should), but to others as well.  The 
protection provided by antidiscrimination laws like the NMHRA that would 
otherwise apply to same-sex couples like Willock and Collingsworth is evis-
cerated by the Huguenins’ exercise of their religious freedom.286  In contrast, 
Yoder’s claim creates no similar problem: There is no parallel legal protection 
that is displaced in light of Yoder being granted an exemption. 
The identity-based nature of the claims described here is distinct from, 
but shares some similarities with, the complicity-based conscience claims de-
scribed by Douglas NeJaime and Reva Siegel.287  According to NeJaime and 
Siegel, some of the recent religious free exercise claims described above—such 
as the refusal to provide contraceptive coverage within health insurance 
plans—are complicity-based conscience claims.  They view the claimants in 
cases such as Hobby Lobby as contending that the provision of insurance coverage 
“would make them complicit with employees who might use the insurance to pur-
chase forms of contraception that the employers viewed as sinful.”288  Similarly, 
those who oppose same-sex marriage for religious reasons claim that any involve-
ment in such a union, whether it entails officiating the ceremony or baking a 
  
285. As in the case of Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 
U.S. 707 (1981), the mere existence of downstream consequences that will ultimately have a 
minor systemic impact or effect on others is distinguishable from those actions that directly 
affect others.  See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
286. The notion that religious exemptions are less palatable in the context of antidiscrimination is 
not a novel one.  For example, in cases like Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), and Bob 
Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), the Supreme Court has refused to 
allow “religious exemptions to obviate anti-discrimination law.”  Shannon Gilreath & Arley 
Ward, Same-Sex Marriage, Religious Accommodation, and the Race Analogy (Wake Forest Univ. 
Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2748565, 2016), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2748565 [https://perma.cc/U8PH-
B4BB].  As Gilreath and Ward note, laws “aimed at the inequality harms of inferiority and 
‘exclusion’” are more directly undermined by religious exemptions that tolerate or facilitate 
discrimination.  Id. 
287. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 77, at 2516; see also Kaveny, supra note 24, at 20 (noting a 
“distinction between laws which require agents themselves to commit what they believe to be 
wrongdoing, and laws which require them to be somehow connected to the wrongful acts of 
other persons”). 
288. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 77, at 2518. 
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wedding cake, makes them complicit in sinful conduct.289  While the focus on 
identity described here is distinct from the notion of complicity, the two are re-
lated: One reason that complicity may be problematic is because of the impli-
cation that one’s actions reflect back on one’s own identity.  Yet, as NeJaime 
and Siegel agree, there must be some limit on what will be protected under the 
guise of such claims. 
NeJaime and Siegel explain that complicity-based conscience claims con-
cern third-party conduct and are also “claims about how to live in a community 
with others who do not share the claimant’s beliefs, and whose lawful conduct 
the person of faith believes to be sinful.”290  Thus, they “support accommodat-
ing claims for religious exemption, but only on the condition that their accom-
modation does not impair attainment of major societal goals or inflict targeted 
material or dignitary harms on other citizens.”291  This approach therefore fo-
cuses primarily on the effects of accommodation, rather than the manner in 
which identity is being exercised.  While the first part of the statement—
impairment of major societal goals—is reflective of concerns motivating the 
protective-projective framework (namely, that identity will be used to obstruct 
operation of the law as applied to others), the second part of the statement di-
verges by focusing purely on the harm inflicted rather than the role identity is 
playing. 
It may be that the types of claims articulated in the context of contracep-
tive coverage and same-sex marriage present unique concerns about third-
party harm.292  Erwin Chemerinsky and Michele Goodwin have argued, in a 
different context, that “people should not have the right to inflict injury on 
  
289. Id. at 2560–63.  NeJaime and Siegel explain how the same reasoning may extend to justify the 
refusal to provide health insurance that covers employees’ same-sex spouses.  Id. at 2563.  
Marty Lederman has pointed out that the governments in question in such cases often “do 
not choose to challenge the sincerity of the ever-evolving theories of complicity.”  Posting of 
Marty Lederman, lederman.marty@gmail.com, to conlawprof@lists.ucla.edu (Sept. 8, 2015, 
6:29 PM) (on file with author).  
290. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 77, at 2519. 
291. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 27, at 3–4; see also Nelson Tebbe et al., When Do Religious 
Accommodations Burden Others?, in THE CONSCIENCE WARS: RETHINKING THE 
BALANCE BETWEEN RELIGION, IDENTITY, AND EQUALITY (Susanna Mancini & Michel 
Rosenfeld eds.) (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 2–4) (defending and attempting to define 
the metric of third-party harm as a means for assessing the legality of religious 
accommodations, which the authors argue must reference substantive and normative values). 
292. See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 77, at 2519; see also id. at 3 (“[W]e call for special scrutiny of 
[complicity-based conscience claims] because of their distinctive capacity to harm other 
citizens.”). 
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others in the name of free exercise of religion.”293  They argue that many of the 
cases in which the Court protected the free exercise of religion can be distin-
guished from cases like Hobby Lobby because, in those cases, no one was 
hurt.294  Basing the constitutionality of one’s action on the harm experienced 
by others raises a number of other questions, however, such as: What type or 
degree of harm will justify the restriction of others’ rights—must it be material 
or physical harm, or is emotional or psychological harm sufficient?295  Ulti-
mately, the question of how religious identity is being exercised—whether is it 
oriented inward, aimed solely at preserving the individual’s identity, or wheth-
er is it other-regarding, focused on how others relate to each other or to the 
government—may be more objective and also more tractable because it does 
not require the same types of subsequent judgments.296 
What would an identity-based framework make of the argument by such 
a claimant that certain laws force her to be complicit in others’ immoral behav-
ior or force her to engage in action that may cause others to perceive her identi-
ty in a different or inaccurate way?  There must be some limit to this line of 
argument—otherwise society would be unable to construct a secular legal sys-
tem capable of effectively governing the relationships among individuals and 
groups.297  One such limit might be to characterize certain religious beliefs as 
falling inside or outside the substantive realm of constitutionally protected re-
ligious exercise—for example, by challenging the validity or credibility of an indi-
vidual’s substantive religious belief.  Arguably, that approach would be more 
offensive to the notion that each individual should be able to define and pursue his 
or her own religious identity.  Another limiting principle, as suggested above, 
  
293. Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 191, at 23 (“As a normative matter, we believe that the 
freedom of one person ends when it inflicts an injury on another.”).  In their essay, which is a 
review of Paul Offit’s book BAD FAITH: WHEN RELIGIOUS BELIEF UNDERMINES 
MODERN MEDICINE (2015), they focus primarily on parents’ invocation of religious 
freedom to deny critical medical care to their children.  Id. at 2–3. 
294. Id. at 30. 
295. Ultimately, NeJaime and Siegel would recognize both dignitary and material harm.  NeJaime 
& Siegel, supra note 77, at 2566. 
296. It is also possible, unless harm is interpreted in a fairly broad manner, that a claim based on 
harm could be undermined by the availability of reasonable alternatives.  For example, if a 
same-sex couple can obtain a cake at any other bakery, arguably there is no material harm and 
some might question whether the dignitary harm resulting from the anomalous decision by 
one baker to refuse service is sufficient to define a constitutional violation. 
297. See Brief for the Federal Respondent at 14, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & 
Sch. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 565 U.S. 171 (2011) (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 
3319555 at *14 (arguing that the petitioner’s request for a categorical ministerial exception 
“would critically undermine the protections of the ADA and a wide variety of other generally 
applicable laws”). 
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might recognize only those claims that do not impose substantial harms or 
burdens on third parties.298 
To the extent such claims are grounded in or are manifestations of reli-
gious identity, a third approach—and the one that is the focus of this Article—
might concentrate on how identity operates in the context of the claim.  To the 
extent the Huguenins seek an exemption from existing law that governs rela-
tionships between individuals, they are relying on identity not only to justify 
differential treatment of themselves, but also to displace a legal framework 
with competing ends.  In the case of Kim Davis, the county court clerk, the 
case is even clearer: Not only is she attempting to project an aspect of religious 
identity that relates to others, she is doing so as a government employee whose 
role is to facilitate operation of the law.  In refusing to issue marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples, her use of religious identity to obstruct the application of the 
law to others could not be more explicit. 
Concerns about third-party harm are not the primary focus of the protective-
projective distinction.  The question of how individuals can live in a community 
with those who have different beliefs is a common concern; one way of re-
sponding to that concern may be not to selectively allow accommodations de-
pending on their effect, but instead to maintain boundaries around the operation 
of identity and the operation of law.  The individual should retain control over 
her identity within the internal sphere, and the Constitution should enable her 
ability to do so; yet in the external sphere, the protection of her identity cannot 
trump forces that properly govern relationships among individuals and 
groups.299 
Under the framework described in this Article, individuals and groups 
can permissibly use identity to enforce their ability to conduct their own lives 
or organizational missions in a certain way—for example, to observe the Sab-
bath or follow a specific diet.  But when they attempt to impose their identity 
on others or to interfere with the law’s ability to govern others (and therefore 
  
298. For a discussion of the difficulties inherent in assessing third-party harm in the religion 
context, see generally Christopher C. Lund, Religious Exemptions, Third-Party Harms and the 
Establishment Clause, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1375 (2016) (discussing, inter alia, issues 
regarding the magnitude, likelihood, and significance of third-party harm). 
299. Enforcement of the protective-projective framework need not be limited to the courts.  It is 
also possible that the framework could be implemented through non-judicial means, by 
structuring the decisions of private actors who influence the political feasibility of such laws.  
For example, private entities have helped to facilitate gubernatorial vetoes of religious liberty 
laws that infringe on the rights of sexual minorities by refusing to invest or hold events in 
such states.  See, e.g., Jonathan M. Katz & Erik Eckholm, Laws Blocking Gay Rights Efforts 
Bring a Backlash in Two Southern States, N.Y. TIMES, April 6, 2016, at A13, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/us/gay-rights-mississippi-north-carolina.html. 
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indirectly impose their identity on others), such use should not give rise to a 
constitutional claim.  The first example falls solidly within the realm of that 
which identity is intended to protect: self and organizational definition in the 
internal sphere.  Under the second formulation, identity begins to encroach on 
the realm of law, which governs the external sphere and relationships among 
individuals and groups. 
To contrast the two: Seeking an accommodation to observe the Sabbath 
would be permissible, but requiring all employers to follow such a policy would 
not.  Requiring that all students be served the same meal, preventing some stu-
dents from adhering to a kosher diet, would not be permissible, nor would 
mandating that the school adhere to kosher guidelines for all meals served to all 
students.  Yet a school could not permissibly refuse to provide some accommo-
dation for an individual student following a kosher diet.  The line drawn is not 
unlike the line regarding multiracial identity: Multiracial individuals should be 
allowed to conceive of their racial identity as they wish on an individual level 
within the internal sphere, yet they must cede when required to the law’s need 
to conceive of their race in a more generalized manner for purposes of con-
structing government policy.300  And while the multiracial view of racial iden-
tity may suggest a world in which racial boundaries are more fluid, that should 
not trump the law’s ability to deconstruct barriers grounded in racial identity 
that remain quite rigid.301  While adherents to a specific religious identity are 
free to pursue that identity in the personal sphere, and must be allowed ac-
commodation where necessary to do so, such identity cannot be used to con-
form the law to individual ends. 
Consider, as an example, the claim made by Christopher Peterson in Pe-
terson v. Wilmur Communications, Inc.302  Peterson was a member of the World 
Church of the Creator and adhered to a belief system called “Creativity,” the 
“central tenet of which is white supremacy and the belief that ‘what is good for 
white people is the ultimate good and what is bad for white people is the ultimate 
sin.’”303  Peterson claimed that his employer demoted him on the basis of his 
religious beliefs in violation of Title VII after a local newspaper ran an article 
  
300. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
301. Lucas, Undoing Race?, supra note 11, at 1294–96, 1300–01 (warning against using identity as 
a driving force for legal frameworks and contending that the state’s ability to ensure equal 
protection should not be confined by any individual’s conception of his or her racial identity). 
302. 205 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (E.D. Wis. 2002). 
303. Jane M. Ritter, The Legal Definition of Religion: From Eating Cat Food to White Supremacy, 20 
TOURO L. REV. 751, 754 (2004) (quoting Peterson, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 1016).  Ritter notes 
that the Creativity doctrine is captured in “two written texts, one of which is titled The White 
Man’s Bible.”  Id. 
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interviewing Peterson about his beliefs.304  In evaluating his claim, the district 
court assumed the task of determining whether Peterson’s beliefs amounted to 
“religion,” ultimately concluding that Creativity did in fact “function” as a reli-
gion for Peterson and that his beliefs in the religion were “sincerely held.”305  
Thus, an employer could not discriminate against Peterson for harboring such 
beliefs or affiliating himself with Creativity.  Doing so might be seen as infringing 
on Peterson’s right to adhere to a specific set of religious beliefs, which may be an 
integral component of his religious identity.  This is in line with a protective 
view of religious identity, as the employer’s action—which penalized Peterson 
for his religious beliefs—was aimed at Peterson’s ability to exercise his identity 
within the internal sphere.  He was also being treated differently because of his 
identity, a harm that has obviously been found cognizable in other contexts, 
like race and gender.306 
Imagine, however, that Peterson wished to object on religious grounds to 
his employer’s decision to close the office in observation of Martin Luther 
King Day.  The harm for Peterson in such an example would be based on his 
ability to project his religious identity on others: His employer’s action in hon-
oring the holiday would have no effect on how his religious identity is exer-
cised internally.  The reason such a decision might be offensive to Peterson is 
because it contradicts the principles of Creativity, yet this Article suggests that 
Peterson should not find support in the Religion Clauses to defend his right to 
impose his religious beliefs on others. 
CONCLUSION 
Identity is a complicated and personal endeavor.  In that respect, religious 
identity shares much in common with other forms of identity.  Thus, in the context 
of legal claims based on religious identity, similar boundaries should be maintained 
around the relative roles of identity and law.  When individuals or groups attempt to 
protect the definition or pursuit of their own identity within the internal sphere, the 
law should help them do so; when, however, they attempt to use identity to co-opt 
or displace the role of law outside of that realm, the law should resist and the Con-
stitution should not enable them.  Recognizing the limited reach of religious identi-
ty can avoid the necessity for a more intrusive role on the part of law in defining and 
interpreting identity itself and help to reconcile the preservation of religious identity 
with the realities of a religiously pluralistic society. 
  
304. Id. 
305. Peterson, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 1019, 1022. 
306. See, e.g., supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing Title VII). 
